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INTRODUCTION
Questions about the appropriate rules and mechanisms of taxation are first
and foremost questions concerning the nature of society. What can be taxed,
what may not, for what purpose, when, and how are all matters that go to the
heart of society and, in particular, concern society’s underlying beliefs and val-
ues vis-a`-vis the meaning and attainment of justice. A modern society is
required to consider these underlying beliefs and values when contemplating
how best to allocate the fruits of social cooperation, including income, wealth,
power, and opportunity.1 This allocation is determined in each societal order by
its major institutions.2 One such key institution is the system of taxation.3
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1 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (rev. ed. 1999) (advocating equal access to the
fruits of social cooperation).
2 Id. at 4–7.
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In reality, much of the tax scholarship generally suggests that questions of
justice cannot form an integral part of the tax debate. The concept of justice, the
argument goes, is a matter of personal preference and to argue about these
matters “is to reduce the discussion . . . to the level of ethics or aesthetics.”4
Notwithstanding the merit of this perspective, a decision-making process that
falls short of soliciting discussions on the meaning and attainment of justice
leads to de facto acceptance of the prevailing socio-economic order and its pre-
tax distribution, luring us to believe that they are just or equitable.5 By so
doing, this approach diverts attention from possible transgressions in fiscal pol-
icy and hinders the development of society and its system of taxation.
As a practical matter, it is challenging to clearly elaborate the meaning and
attainment of justice and, for that matter, to prove the validity of any one nor-
mative theory.6 Normative perspectives are often subjective in nature and can
be presented as self-evident truths.7 It is nonetheless possible to meaningfully
discuss competing arguments of moral judgment by elaborating on the basic
beliefs and values about society and its mechanisms for achieving justice.8 In
3 Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 227–28 (Batoche Books
2001) (1848) (discussing the methods used by society to redistribute property).
4 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROB-
LEM OF FISCAL POLICY 18 (1938); see also Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Rawls, Justice, and the
Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981). Cf. Thomas Nagel, Comments: Individual Versus
Collective Responsibility, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2015, 2019 (2004) (“The concern for social
justice seems to have almost disappeared from the nation’s political discourse.”).
5 See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUS-
TICE 7–8 (2002) (criticizing the frequent acceptance of the societal status quo as a basis for
tax debate and policies). See generally infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
6 Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335, 341–45 (1980) (justifying a theory “of moral causation as an account
of legal change”); Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword: Colloquium on Wealth Transfer Taxation,
51 TAX L. REV. 357, 361 (1996) (addressing the pragmatic implications of diverse normative
perspectives and concluding that “when it comes to tax system design . . . there is much
room for disagreement . . . as to what constitutes ‘the best we can be.’ ”).
7 But see infra notes 24–36, 80–85, 132–35, 192–98 and accompanying text (discussing
underlying rationales of the theories explored in this Article).
8 William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor War-
ren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 950 (1975) (“Matters of fairness are not generally subject to
logical demonstration from independent premises. All that reason can do is elaborate the
implications of plausible hypotheses in order to facilitate an informed choice among them.”).
There are several useful examples of scholarly discussions that explore normative arguments
for the meaning and attainment of justice in taxation. See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progres-
sive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1995) [hereinafter Byrne, 1995]; Donna M.
Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700 (1999) [hereinafter
Byrne, 1999]; Yoseph M. Edrey, Al Huka Deklerativit V’ Huka Constitutivit [A Declarative
and a Constructed Constitution—The Right for Property Under the Israeli Constitutional
Law and Its Location on the “Constitutional Rights” Scale], 28 MISHPATIM L. REV. 461
(1997) [in Hebrew]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV 465 (1987); Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2345
(1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607 (1996); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration
of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221
(1995); Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What
Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004).
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fact, even a very preliminary examination of the current tax discourse reveals it
is already grounded in profound normative claims. Often, when inheritance tax
is debated, for example, a person’s right to transfer her assets to the next gener-
ation is invoked.9 Similarly, when citizens complain about high tax rates they
generally argue against what is, from their perspective, an unjust appropria-
tion.10 However, the extent to which the existing normative tax discourse is
based on anecdotes and used to advance self-serving interests rather than a
well-defined framework of principles and rationales is striking.
A candid and comprehensive tax discourse will allow society a more accu-
rate and meaningful understanding of its tax system than what currently exists.
Such a discourse may also further the development of taxation in a manner
consistent with society’s normative aspirations alongside the more commonly
debated pragmatic constraints. This Article promotes developing a broader nor-
mative tax discourse by returning to fundamentals and re-examining three rele-
vant political theories and how they shed light on taxation: the theory of natural
entitlement, utilitarianism, and Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. The Arti-
cle explores the perspectives of these theories on fiscal policy, particularly with
respect to one question: What can taxpayers expect to receive in fair return for
their expended labor and capital? The Article opines that under all three politi-
cal theories taxpayers can generally expect to only receive a net return on labor
and capital—gross return on their investments less the sum needed for mainte-
nance of the existing societal order. In an unjust, or suboptimal, societal order
(however this measure is conceived by the three theories), further taxation can
be expected to rectify this condition. Importantly, such additional taxation
becomes a plausible scenario under each of the theories explored, supporting
some form of redistributive mechanism.
Section I of this Article presents the entitlement theory and addresses the
concept of natural or divine law. Section II discusses utilitarianism, its aim to
increase aggregate utility, and the social welfare function as a modern interpre-
tation of utilitarianism that has come to dominate the contemporary, especially
professional, tax discourse. Section III explores the Rawlsian doctrine of justice
as fairness. While each section examines possible implications of the three the-
ories on taxation, in its Summary and Conclusions the Article seeks to offer a
9 See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively: Replacing the Estate Tax
with an Inheritance Tax, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, June 2007, at 5 (proposing replacement
of the estate tax with an inheritance tax based on efficiency as well as equity considerations).
See also Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Com-
prehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (2009); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHA-
PIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 7 (2005);
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283,
304 (1994). Cf. Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263,
372–73 (2000) (“Wealth might prove a burden for some, a warm blanket for most others.
But the choice to retain rather than spend is not one for which society or less fortunate
persons can impose a charge, because it is not a benefit to the saver for which the state, or
the congeries of social forces, or an unfair nature can claim due.”).
10 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 72–74 (4th ed. 2008) (citing several polls to discuss Americans’ per-
spectives regarding the fairness of progressivity in taxation. Note, however, that the authors
identify numerous misconceptions where public perceptions do not match available data
concerning actual progressivity in the tax burden distribution).
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broader normative undertaking. Due to the scope of this Article, as well as
space limitations, the Article does not address the advantages and disadvan-
tages of utilizing the tax system to advance redistributive ends nor does it fully
explore the theory of optimal taxation. These issues are left for future works.
I. ENTITLEMENT AND THE NATURAL ORDER
A. John Locke
The Lockean description of the origin of mankind invokes individuals as
free and equal persons,11 living in a “state of nature” and lacking political
authority to govern them.12 This ideal state was short-lived as some individuals
inflicted harm on others, undermining the harmonic state of nature and pushing
humanity into war.13 According to Locke, abhorrence of war led humanity to
join together to form civil society.14 The idea of civil rights, especially those
rights that concern private ownership of property, is central to the Lockean
model and its application to tax.15 Locke posits that individuals are property
holders in the state of nature, and he maintains that they continue to possess
property under the regime of civil society.16
Locke’s theory and conception of rights relies on the premise that in the
state of nature, earth belonged to humanity as a whole.17 According to this
historical proposition, resources were initially owned in common by man-
kind.18 Locke does not regard people in the initial state as having exclusive
rights over resources.19 In fact, anyone could have obtained shared resources
for personal use by simply exerting the effort to do so.20 This includes, for
11 JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY § 21 (1690), reprinted in
33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 25–84 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 6th prtg. 1996)
(“The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth . . . .”).
12 Id. Locke explains that the meaning of freedom is that people are not subject to the will
of others and that everyone possesses equal (but not necessarily the same) powers and juris-
diction over these powers. Thus, there is no hierarchy in the state of nature. Hierarchy,
Locke claimed, meant slavery. See also id. at 25, ch. II, § 4.
13 Id. at 28, ch. II–III, §§ 13, 16–21 (describing the state of war as a condition in which
people lose their freedom to the impartial judgment of others).
14 Id. at 28, 44, 55, ch. II, VI, XI, §§ 13, 87–88, 134. In entering the Lockean type of civil
society, people gave the right to govern themselves to the political authority. Locke presents
this authority as a trustee, acting on behalf of the interests of its citizens. In this way, the
political authority becomes almost a servant for the common good.
15 See, e.g., id. at 53, ch. IX, § 124 (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property.”) (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 53, ch. IX, §§ 124–25.
17 Id. at 30, ch. V, §§ 24–25. Locke’s interpretation of the beginning of time is that God
gave power to “them” (i.e., Mankind) not “him” (Adam). Id. at 30, ch. V, § 24.
18 Id. at 30, ch. V, §§ 25–26; see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297 (1988).
19 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 31, ch. V, §§ 27–28.
20 Id. at 31, ch. V, §§ 28–31 (“Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet
who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out
of the hands of Nature where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and
hath thereby appropriated it to himself.”) id. at § 28.
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example, picking apples from a tree or gathering crops in a field.21 Locke’s
basic tenet, which came to be known as the “labor-mixing principle,”22 is that
individuals are entitled to holdings that result from the application of their
labor: “Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature ha[s] pro-
vided and left it in, he ha[s] mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”23
Locke’s labor-mixing principle and conception of rights give rise to sev-
eral key justifications in support of a system of private property. These justifi-
cations become imperative in the evaluation of tax issues including, for
example, the right to tax, the goals of taxation, and the tax rate structure. The
first justification for a system of private property, and the one most commonly
identified with the Lockean paradigm, addresses the individual and her right to
autonomy; the other two, more modern justifications of the theory, concern
labor and its value to society.
Locke’s theory is grounded in fundamental respect for free will and the
right to autonomy.24 According to this view, the first justification for a system
of private property rights holds that individuals have a right to self-ownership,
to the labor they apply, and thus, by extension, to the product of this labor.25
Exercise of free will coupled with the assignment of labor is the means by
which individuals expand their right of self-ownership over external resources
and make these resources their own.26
Conversely, the second justification in support of a system of private prop-
erty rights is that labor is virtuous in and of itself and, therefore, laborers
deserve reward and encouragement.27 This perspective draws from a theologi-
cal belief that the exercise of labor is the manner by which individuals enjoy
the goodness the world provides.28 Since labor fulfills a godly design, it is
virtuous on its own merit.29 This idea corresponds with the conviction that
labor is generally unappealing and requires remuneration to be performed.30
A third, more modern justification relies on utilitarian principles to sug-
gest that labor deserves reward because it adds value that benefits society at
large.31 According to this line of thinking, the value one creates through labor
21 Id. at 30, ch. V, § 27.
22 See, e.g., Edward Feser, There Is No Such Thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition, 22 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 56, 61 (2005) (referencing Locke’s “labor-mixing” principle).
23 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 30, ch. V, § 26.
24 Id. at 30, ch. IV, § 22 (holding that free will and the right to autonomy are virtues pos-
sessed by all individuals).
25 Id. at 30, ch. V, § 27.
26 Id. at 30–31, ch. V, §§ 27–28.
27 Byrne, 1999, supra note 8, at 708–09 (citing Hughes, supra note 18, at 288).
28 See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 11, at 31–32, ch. V, § 31.
29 Id. at 31, ch. V, § 31 (“God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, com-
manded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him.”); see also
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 125 (1994) (suggesting that Americans’ perspectives about
wealth and money are partly drawn from the idea of serving God); Jeremy Waldron, Book
Review, 102 ETHICS 401, 402 (1992) (reviewing STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY
(1990)).
30 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 35, ch. V, § 48.
31 Id. at 34, ch. V, §§ 42–43.
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ultimately trickles down to others and improves society’s general well-being,
or, in other words, enlarges the societal pie.32 It is not enough to merely
acknowledge the value of labor; rather, the right to private property must be
established to motivate individuals to invest effort.33 Over the long term, such a
reward system advances the exercise of effort and, consequently, the establish-
ment of wealthier, more resilient nations.34 One well-known example Locke
offers for this “trickle-down” argument concerns uncultivated, non-productive
land. Locke explains that no matter how large and potentially prosperous uncul-
tivated land might be, it is still worthless without human effort to cultivate it.35
Further, labor is not only necessary to cultivate land, such as in sowing seeds or
gathering crops, but it also creates more demand for the labor of others.36
Accordingly, the benefits created by transforming uncultivated land to produc-
tive land eventually trickle down from the landowner to the broader society,
including workers and consumers, through advantages such as additional job
opportunities and greater productivity.
As the above discussion illustrates, the Lockean theory suggests that a
system of private property rights acknowledges the innate bond between a per-
son’s free will, right to autonomy, and labor, or more accurately, the product of
one’s labor. Private property rights also manifest society’s gratitude for human
effort and serve as a system of incentives to elicit productive outlays and the
enlargement of the societal pie. Despite these important ends, Locke narrows
the application of the labor-mixing principle and, accordingly, entitlement to
private appropriation, with two restrictions known as the first and second
“Lockean Provisos.”37
According to the first Lockean Proviso, the accumulation of private prop-
erty is permissible only to the extent that it can be maintained without spoil-
32 Id. at 34, ch. V, § 43; see also id. at 33, ch. V, § 40 (“[C]onsider what the difference is
between an acre of land planted . . . and an acre of the same land lying in common without
any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater
part of the value.”).
33 Compare id. at 34, ch. V, § 44 (describing how the invention of property protects the
products of labor: “[Man] . . . had . . . in himself the great foundation of property; and that
which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when
invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not
belong in common to others.”), with Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Prop-
erty: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1683 (1988)
(“In this [Hobbesian] model of human nature, limitless self-interest and the consequent
urgent need for self-defense require the most expansive possible notion of private property
. . . .”).
34 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 33–34, ch. V, §§ 40–41.
35 Id. at 33–34, ch. V, § 41 (“[S]everal nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in
land and poor in all the comforts of life . . . with the materials of plenty . . . yet, for want of
improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy . . . .”)
(emphasis added); id. at 34, ch. V, § 43 (“It is labour, then, which puts the greatest part of
value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth anything.”) (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 34, ch. V, § 43.
37 Id. at 30, ch. V, § 26; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Economic Efficiency and
the Lockean Proviso, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401 (1987) (identifying the “Lock-
ean Proviso” as stating that the “acquisition of unowned property is permissible ‘at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.’ ”).
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age.38 Waste is undesirable under the Lockean model.39 It follows that the first
Proviso primarily allows personal appropriation when necessary for subsis-
tence.40 Thus, for example, a person cannot retain one hundred acorns and
assert entitlement over them if she can only consume fifty acorns, leaving the
other fifty to spoil. This person can rightfully appropriate only the fifty acorns
she will use.
According to the second Lockean Proviso, appropriation of resources is
permissible only “where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others.”41 Hence, if one hundred acorns constitute food supply of an entire
village, one person cannot claim all one hundred acorns for herself since this
will not leave sufficient acorns for others. Locke, however, does not clarify
how much of any resource should be left for others, making the application of
the second Proviso rather difficult. Even more problematic are attempts to
apply the Lockean Provisos to the conditions of modern economy.
Locke’s model envisions the world as populated with few people and suf-
ficient resources for everyone.42 Compared to this starting point, today’s world
is considerably more populous, with some goods becoming increasingly
scarce.43 Under these conditions, Locke’s Provisos are harder to sustain and
justify.44 Specifically, in a market economy, where resources are exchanged for
money, individuals are able to appropriate resources beyond immediate needs
and bargain any surpluses of perishable goods for monetary compensation,
which never spoils.45 Accordingly, appropriation beyond immediate needs, a
practice forbidden under Lockean principles, is made possible by a market
economy. Applying the labor-mixing principle to modern market conditions
38 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 33, ch. V, § 37; but see id. at 34–35, ch. V, §§ 45–50 (explain-
ing the development of storage and trade, which greatly undermines his first Proviso).
39 Id. at 31, ch. V, § 30 (“Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.”); id. at
35, ch. V, § 46 (“[I]t was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he
could make use of.”).
40 Id. at 33, ch. V, § 37 (“[M]en had a right to appropriate by their labour, each one to
himself, as much of the things of Nature as he could use . . . .”).
41 Id. at 30, ch. V, § 26. According to Locke, the “enough and as good” Proviso was not
very limiting as the Americas had access to what seemed at the time to be unlimited
unclaimed resources. See id. at 33, ch. V, § 41. Some interpret the “enough and as good”
proviso as applying to the market as a whole; thus, making goods available for purchase
becomes analogous with leaving “enough and as good.” Byrne, 1999, supra note 8, at 711
(citing Arvid Pardo, An Opportunity Lost, in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 23
(Bernard H. Oxman et al. eds., 1983)).
42 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 32–33, ch. V, § 36.
43 Scarcity introduces conflicts over the allocation of resources. See id. at 32, ch. V, § 33;
Waldron, supra note 29, at 403 (“[T]alk of property makes little sense except against a
background of scarcity . . . .”).
44 According to Locke, money enables the unlimited accumulation of wealth because it
permits an enhanced capacity of durable goods production. LOCKE, supra note 11, at 35, ch.
V, §§ 46–48. This implies that money does not decrease social productivity but rather
increases it. See also infra note 46.
45 LOCKE, supra note 11, at 35, ch. V, § 47 (“And thus came in the use of money; some
lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would
take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.”).
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thereby results in “disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth,” a
state of affairs predicted by Locke centuries ago.46
Disparity in wealth and income, which causes much concern in modern
civilizations, is acceptable and even encouraged under the Lockean paradigm.47
In Locke’s view, economic differences prod individuals to labor which, in turn,
advances the economy, improves human condition, and enlarges the societal
pie.48 It is not surprising, then, that in his theory of entitlement, Locke does not
condemn inequality. Under the Lockean paradigm, it is industry and labor, not
equality, which are virtuous.
Accumulation of money is fair, according to the Lockean model, precisely
because money is a durable, non-perishable good that, Locke maintains, not
only causes no harm when horded by individuals but benefits the entire soci-
ety.49 It is unclear, however, whether Locke would have been as forgiving of
money accrual given what is known today about potential repercussions of
large concentrations of accumulated wealth and income. Recent empirical work
demonstrates that large concentrations of wealth and income provide wealthy
individuals with disproportionate power and influence, stratifying society into
classes of citizens and leading to socio-political unrest and slow economic
growth.50 In particular, there is a danger of perpetuating and magnifying these
harms through the flow of poorly distributed fortune from one generation to the
next.51 In line with such evidence, it remains questionable at what point entitle-
ment to private property becomes sufficiently unwarranted that it is no longer
justifiable under the tenets of Locke’s entitlement doctrine.52 Additionally, in a
market economy, money serves as a necessary means to attain subsistence
46 Id. at 35, ch. V, § 50; see also id. at 35, ch. V, § 48 (“[A]s different degrees of industry
were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave
them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them.”); id. at 35–36, ch. V, §§ 50–51 (“[I]t is
plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of
the earth . . . they having, by consent, found out and agreed in a way how a man may,
rightfully and without injury, possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving
gold and silver . . . . For as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
47 Id. at 33, ch. V, § 48.
48 Id. (“Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded
up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich,
never so free for them to take.”) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 35, ch. V, § 50 (asserting that gold and silver “may continue long in a man’s
possession without decaying for the overplus . . . .”); see also supra notes 44–48.
50 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation,
111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1407–13 (2002) (reviewing DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000)); James R. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 832–36, 840–48 (2001); Roberto
Perotti, Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 755,
755–57 (1993); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the
Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 149–150 (1996).
51 Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to Practical Application: The Vision of a Good Society
and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 442–45 (2006) (discussing the harms of mal-
distributed inter-generationally transmitted wealth).
52 Cf. LOCKE, supra note 11, at 35, ch. V, § 46 (“[I]f he would give his nuts for a piece of
metal, pleased with its colour, or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling
pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others; he
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased.”).
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needs. Once basic resources turn scarce, their dearth undermines the merit of
unrestricted private appropriation, since “enough and as good” resources are
not left for others.53
In view of Locke’s basic stance that moral entitlement to holdings is the
product of labor-mixing activities, society and its institutions must assume
responsibility for protecting the resulting distribution of holdings and corre-
sponding system of private property. To this end, individuals are required to
share the financial burden of societal protection through payment of taxes.54
Locke, however, does not discuss more extensive public responsibilities, such
as construction of infrastructure, including highways and parks, nor does he
consider utilizing the tax system to advance redistributive goals.55 At first
glance, then, the Lockean model of entitlement yields a relatively limited gov-
ernment and tax bill. Under a more probing examination, however, matters
appear less clear-cut.
The three justifications for the Lockean paradigm defend entitlement to
private property based on autonomy, desert, and productivity grounds. Con-
vincing claims have been made, however, against the strength of any of these
justifications to support entitlement to the entire share of market returns.56 In
real-world circumstances, it is generally impossible to draw a clear distinction
between market returns resulting from one’s effort and exercise of free will and
those returns that derive from factors outside of the individual’s control, such
as luck, effort exerted by others, and societal infrastructures.57 To the extent
53 Cf. John T. Sanders, Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 367, 372–73, 377–80 (1987) (discussing the “enough and as good” proviso).
54 See, e.g., 3 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, Public Finance and Distributive Justice, in PUBLIC
FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 135, 136 (2000) [hereinafter MUSGRAVE, Public
Finance and Distributive Justice].
55 For early discussions of public goods and their social role, see ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS 325 (4th ed. 1850); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
230–31 (1974) (discussing the distributive role of society).
56 See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 5, at 68–69 (discussing the various faults of
resource distributions achieved by an unaltered free market economy); Michael J. Graetz, To
Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 275–77 (1983) (making a case for
market returns to depend on factors outside of any one individual’s control, including forces
of market supply and demand as well as societal conditions. “[M]ost production is based
upon the joint use of different resources, typically provided by different people . . . some
share of total market returns . . . [is also] attributable to societal conditions. . . . All receipts
are joint products, both individual and societal. Because individual characteristics and social
characteristics are both essential to their joint outcome, there is simply no means by which a
percentage of individual and social ‘dessert’ can be calculated.”) (emphasis added); Edrey,
supra note 8 (further developing the role which society plays in the process of income pro-
duction—coined and explored as the “joint venture.”).
57 For example, an athlete’s accomplishments are the result of genetic and environmental
factors over which she has no control. Similarly, talent, age, health, and social positions are
greatly influenced by luck, a morally arbitrary factor. See, e.g., HERBERT KIESLING, TAXA-
TION AND PUBLIC GOODS: A WELFARE-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
119–20 (1992) (discussing the issues of deservedness and reward as notions requiring an
active action of the individual); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44
STAN. L. REV. 961, 1007–09 & n.131 (1992). However, according to entitlement theorists, as
long as initial entitlements were justly acquired and all subsequent transfers are freely
entered into, inequality in resources, luck, and other people’s effort may not make one less
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that wealth and income accruals result from factors other than one’s effort and
free will, claims to such accumulations may be morally questioned.
Instead of embracing the prevailing market allocation unaltered, it may
make more sense to consider possible infirmities in the existing distribution of
holdings. Taking this view, taxation could be levied, not only because of its
functions as a revenue-raising mechanism—necessary to secure the existing
distribution of holdings—but also considering its potential to correct this distri-
bution. That is, taxation may appropriate from individuals the share of market
returns that is not rightfully theirs and redirect (i.e., redistribute) it toward a
more entitled destination.
According to the productivity justification, allowing individuals to reap
the rewards of their labor is meant to encourage future efforts. Taxation, how-
ever, does not necessarily depress productivity in the sense of removing, either
wholly or partially, the incentive to engage in work and other productive
endeavors.58 Empirical research illustrates, for example, that monetary rewards,
including increases in after-tax wages, do not always correspond with the num-
ber of hours people work.59 Such findings suggest the relationship between
economic incentives and productive outlays depends on different factors,
including the desire for power, satisfaction, and security.60 That is, at least part
of the reason people work is not driven by monetary considerations and people
may accordingly respond to taxation in ways that are not entirely predictable.61
In fact, recent studies suggest that the possibility of acquiring a relatively
higher economic standing may be a more successful inducement to effort and
productivity than simple economic rewards.62 Thus, as long as after-tax market
entitled to her holdings. See, e.g., Nozick’s theory of entitlement, infra notes 86–89 and
accompanying text.
58 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 10, at 121–22 (explaining that taxes have two counter-
vailing effects. On the one hand, taxes reduce the marginal reward for productive activities
and, by so doing, make these activities less attractive. This effect is known as the substitution
or incentive effect. On the other hand, most taxes make individuals poorer so that they need
to work more, rather than less, in order to maintain their living standard. This effect is
known as the income effect.).
59 See, e.g., id. at 124–27 (reviewing the literature and concluding that “[a]lthough, as with
many economic questions, there is controversy, it is still fair to say that the consensus is that
labor supply responsiveness [to taxation] is fairly low.”). Cf. Joseph Bankman & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1922–26 (1987) (finding that work contributes to social standing and
self-esteem and showing that elasticity of labor is generally low, but higher for married
women).
60 Carroll, for example, underscores the key role of non-monetary motivations to work,
including achieving professional gratification, power-lust, and philanthropic ambitions.
Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 465, 477 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
61 Id. at 480 (discussing aggregate effect of bequest taxes). For a good discussion on the
complexity of factors to potentially influence individuals’ inclination to work, see Byrne,
1999, supra note 8, at 725–26.
62 According to Frank, relative standing, in terms of income and wealth, is more significant
than one’s absolute standard of living. Thus, as long as greater effort results in an improve-
ment in relative conditions, the imposition of tax does not create a disincentive for produc-
tive effort. Note, however, that taxation leads to at least some welfare loss since taxpayers’
optimal economic behavior may be affected by taxes even when there is no apparent change
in the choices they make. This can happen when the income and substitution effects of
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returns remain relatively high to other, comparable taxpayers (however compa-
rable taxpayers are conceived), an entitlement to the entire share of economic
rewards may not be necessary.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that making some individuals better off
does not inevitably lead to increased welfare for the entire society, as suggested
by the trickle-down proposition. The presence of poverty, rising inequality, and
social stratification, alongside considerable wealth and prosperity of the mod-
ern world,63 undermines the argument that wealth trickles down the economic
hierarchy.64 Such conditions cast doubts over the workings of the market econ-
omy in general and unrestricted entitlement to private property in particular.
They challenge the legitimacy of inequality, including disparities created under
the system of entitlement and, more profoundly, the soundness of the theory
itself. At the very least, these conditions highlight the need for constraints on
entitlement to private property in order to ease economic inequality and allow
social, economic, and political benefits to reach citizens across the societal
spectrum.65
taxation cancel each other out. Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation and the Incentive
Problem, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH
490, 499–505 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); see generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE
RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); ROBERT H. FRANK &
PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995).
63 See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income
Between 1979 and 2007 (2011) (finding after-tax income for the highest-income households
grew more than it did for any other group. Between 1979 and 2007, income grew by 275%
for the top 1% of households; 65% for the next 19%; 40% for the next 60%; 18% for the
bottom 20%.). Cf. Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and
Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 162
& nn.1–2 (2003) (discussing deprived conditions of developing countries in particular).
64 For example, during the mid-1970s and late 1980s, many U.S. working families struggled
to rise above the poverty line when faced with stagnated wages and crushing inequality,
while other Americans enjoyed much better conditions. Gilbert argues that overall, the work-
ing poor in the U.S. included about 15.6% of the population in 1996, compared to a lower
rate of 13.9% in 1990. Neil Gilbert, The Size and Influence of the Underclass: An Exagger-
ated View, 37 SOC’Y 43, 45 (1999). Many of the working poor occupy part-time or tempo-
rary jobs that pay little and provide few opportunities to gain professional skills or develop
careers, further decreasing their earning potential. James Midgley, The United States: Wel-
fare, Work and Development, 10 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 284, 285–291 (2001).
65 This could be done, for example, by implementing redistributional measures within the
tax system that aim at guaranteeing basic living conditions, such as shelter and education, for
all. For the role of the tax system in advancing redistributive goals see, for example, Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 11–22 (2006) (suggesting
that personal income taxation, in particular, best serves to advance the goal of redistribution
via the tax system); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute
Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2003) (“[L]egal rules should not be used to redistrib-
ute to the poor . . . [because] the tax system is a better tool for redistribution . . . .”); Richard
M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal
Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1682–83 (2005)
(“Despite . . . many qualifications . . . the income tax, and particularly the personal income
tax, is probably the only significantly progressive element found in most tax systems.”). Cf.
WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 1
(1953) (“Progressive taxation is now regarded as one of the central ideas of modern demo-
cratic capitalism and is widely accepted as a secure policy commitment which does not
require serious examination.”). Notwithstanding the above references, the redistributive goal
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It becomes evident that the levy of taxation may not only occur without
violating the Lockean entitlement paradigm, but also may contribute to its
integrity. Taxes need not reduce the incentive to engage in productive efforts
nor do they necessarily serve to eliminate its rewards or infringe upon one’s
right to free will and autonomy. On the contrary, taxes have the potential to
ensure effort is rightfully, but not excessively, compensated and economic
incentives remain at an efficient and effective level.
B. Robert Nozick
Similar to Locke, Robert Nozick develops his theory from an initial “state
of nature,”66 a state of affairs lacking political authority where individuals live
and obtain goods and services using whatever means they have in their posses-
sion.67 Under these conditions, Nozick argues, individuals form a protective
societal model.68 Nozick’s basic assumption is that this society naturally devel-
ops into a state very limited in powers and responsibilities, an undertone that
precludes most forms of taxation, particularly those tax structures that are redis-
tributive in nature.69
The meaning of entitlement under the Nozickean paradigm includes the
Lockean right to own property justly acquired.70 Nozick’s conception of enti-
tlement, however, expands beyond simple ownership to also emphasize the
right to dispose of property.71 These aspects of entitlement, Nozick prescribes,
cannot be challenged without compelling justifications. In fact, according to
Nozick, individuals’ rights are so strong and extensive that they raise the ques-
tion of what, if anything, the state can do without violating these rights.72 Pro-
tecting individuals’ rights is understood to require limiting state’s powers to
narrow functions, such as enforcement of contracts and protection against
force, theft, and fraud.73 In keeping with Nozick’s view, “any more extensive
of taxation remains highly controversial and is often advocated to come with a hefty price on
growth and efficiency. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-
OFF 1 (1975) (“[P]ursuit of efficiency necessarily creates inequalities. And hence society
faces a tradeoff between equality and efficiency.”); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE xvii (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (2001) (asserting that welfare is the only appropriate
legal policy standard). For the view that fairness and equity considerations on one hand and
efficiency constraints on the other may in fact enhance, rather than be in conflict with, each
other see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
66 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 10.
67 Id. at 10–12.
68 Id. at 12–17.
69 Id. at 12–17, 26–27, 113–118.
70 See, e.g., id. at 185 (“[E]ach individual deserves what he gets unaided by his own efforts;
or rather, no one else can make a claim of justice against this holding.”).
71 Id. at 160 (“From each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he
makes for himself . . . and what others choose to do for him and choose to give him of what
they’ve been given previously (under this maxim) and haven’t yet expended or trans-
ferred . . . From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.”).
72 According to Nozick, individuals have rights, and there are things no one may do to
anyone else without violating these rights. Id. at ix.
73 Id. at 26–27.
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state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is
unjustified.”74
Nozick’s assumption of a state limited in powers and responsibilities pre-
supposes the merit of entitlements to existing property.75 Nozick accordingly
argues that just distribution of resources results from subsequent, freely entered
exchanges.76 Government meddling with private property through the levy of
taxation becomes equivalent to forced labor because it requires individuals to
undertake additional labor to compensate for taxes.77 This, Nozick posits, vio-
lates basic rights and liberties, a far more devastating outcome than an insult to
efficiency.78 Government intervention by means of redistributive taxation—
taking from one person to improve the lot of another—is perceived to be a
greater rights and liberties violation, as it more aggressively interferes with
individuals’ possessions.79 It is therefore clear that the Nozickean description
of the state does not account for public education, childcare, or parks, as these
outlays necessarily involve more elaborate forms of taxation than those
required by a stripped-down societal model.
At the heart of the Nozickean doctrine are two rationales. The first ratio-
nale draws on the idea of free exercise of natural rights and entitlements and its
prospect, over the long run, to improve everyone’s well-being.80 As Richard
Posner, for example, claims: “The individual may be completely selfish but he
cannot, in a well-regulated market economy, promote his self-interest without
benefiting others as well as himself.”81 A second rationale explains the theory
74 Id. at ix.
75 Id. at 224–26.
76 Id. at 186–87.
77 Id. at 172 (“Whether it is done through taxation on wages over a certain amount, or
through seizure of profits, or through there being a big social pot so that it’s not clear what’s
coming from where and what’s going where . . . [such policies necessarily involve] appropri-
ating the actions of other persons. Seizing the results of someone’s labor is equivalent to
seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various activities . . . This process
whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a
property right in you. Just as having such partial control and power of decision, by right,
over an animal . . . .”).
78 First and foremost, taxation is viewed as a violation of the right to self-ownership. Id. at
171–72. As Kymlicka notes, “If I own my self, then I own my talents. And if I own my
talents, then I own whatever I produce with my self-owned talents.” WILL KYMLICKA, CON-
TEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 109 (2d ed. 2002).
79 Nozick, supra note 55, at 171–72. Progressive taxation does not aim to maintain the
existing distribution of resources but rather to change it. A somewhat related argument is
that progressive taxation constitutes “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. See Calvin R.
Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 86,
105–06, 124 (1996) (arguing that the Takings Clause requires that federal taxation satisfy the
benefit theory of taxation and be levied relative to benefits the taxpayer receives from the
government. Because the benefit principle does not necessarily fit with progressive tax rates,
progressive rates are understood to violate the Takings Clause.).
80 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 157. Some argue, however, that Nozick does not provide any
substantive support for his theory of entitlement. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism
Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136, 137–38 (1975) (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, ANAR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)); cf. NOZICK, supra note 55, at 150 (stating the theory of
entitlement as if it is self-evident).
81 Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
132 (1979); cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 53 (C. K. Ogden, ed., R.
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as inherently drawing on the concept of self-ownership, derived from either the
idea of equality (treating people as equals) or the notion of liberty (allowing
individuals to live as they choose).82 This line of thinking suggests that an
entitlement to holdings is fundamental to the principle of treating individuals as
equal beings who cannot be exploited as resources for others.83 According to
this logic, the theory of entitlement is the best paradigm by which to assess the
nature and scope of any cost that can be legitimately incurred by one person for
the benefit of another.84 At the same time, treating people with respect, by
respecting their individual rights, is to everyone’s advantage, as this allows us
“to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of our-
selves . . . aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing
the same dignity.”85
Similar to Locke, Nozick suggests that individuals’ free exercise of labor
is a method by which their right of self-ownership extends to external
resources. Nozick acknowledges entitlement to holdings that result from any
one of an individual’s resources, including the fruits of her natural abilities,
such as superior physical or intellectual attributes.86 Nozick therefore assumes
that individuals are morally entitled to what others, at times, consider the prod-
uct of luck, social cooperation, or both.87 Alternatively, it can be argued that
under the Nozickean doctrine it is not luck or social cooperation, but rather
effort expended in productive activity or productivity itself that results in enti-
tlement,88 a more intuitively appealing system of rewards.89 Notwithstanding
either interpretation of entitlement, self-ownership and the corresponding
notion of mutual gains represent a rather limited platform for treating people in
the same manner while respecting their rights and liberties. It is not merely the
actions of isolated individuals that affect society and its market economy. Civil
rights and obligations, as well as background circumstances, luck, and institu-
tional conditions also play an important role in market production and the
Hildreth, trans., Humanities Press, Inc. 1931) (1864) [hereinafter BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION] (“Society is so constituted that, in labouring for our particular good, we labour
also for the good of the whole. We cannot augment our own means of enjoyment without
augmenting also the means of others.”).
82 KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 107–28.
83 See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 55, at 30–31. Rights affirm individuals’ “separate exis-
tences” and take seriously “the existence of distinct individuals who are not resources for
others.” Id. at 33.
84 KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 103–04. The theory of utilitarianism may be understood to
undermine the existence of such limits. Cf. infra notes 141–52 and accompanying text.
85 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 334 (emphasis added).
86 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 225–26. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 499 (1980)
(suggesting the value of individuals relies on their “capacity to produce for others.”).
87 See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 55, at 226 (“Whether or not people’s natural assets are
arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what flows from
them.”).
88 Id. at 225.
89 Cf. id. at 224–25 (using a negative argument to support claim that people deserve that
which comes from their natural assets); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a
Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 614 (1996) (defining the principle of desert as
relying on personal traits such as ability, effort, and talent).
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resulting distribution of entitlements.90 Accordingly, if Nozick’s principles are
to truly convey notions of equality and liberty, they should lead to a more
generous understanding of the state and taxation than what is generally envi-
sioned under the Nozickean doctrine.91
When discussing the issue of background circumstances, Nozick initially
appears more responsive to the need to correct the distribution of entitlements
generated under an unfettered market economy. Specifically, Nozick explores
the possibility of compensating for inequality in circumstances caused as a
result of unlucky life events.92 However, such compensation, according to
Nozick, conflicts with his basic understanding of rights. In Nozick’s words:
The major objection to speaking of everyone’s having a right to various things
such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these
“rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people
may have rights and entitlements over these. No one has a right to something whose
realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights
and entitlements over.93
Thus, without a mechanism to effectively compensate for diversity in assets,
adjust for life circumstances, and affect the resulting distribution of posses-
sions, Nozick’s theory is highly susceptible to unequal patterns of
distribution.94
The issue of inequality comes up again when Nozick lays out the three
main tenets of his doctrine: (1) the principle of transfer—specifying that hold-
ings justly acquired can be freely transferred;95 (2) the principle of initial acqui-
sition—offering an account of how people initially came to own their
90 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91 KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 107–10 (discussing the notion of self-ownership). For an
example of a theory based on the idea of self-ownership that leads to different conclusions
than Nozick’s theory does, see the discussion on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, infra notes
188–237 and accompanying text. There are interesting similarities between Nozick’s para-
digm and Rawls’s theory of justice. Nozick not only appeals to the principle of equality
(albeit one that is broadly conceived), but he also makes a case against utilitarianism, which
is an important part of Rawls’s thesis. Rawls, for example, claims that utilitarianism fails to
treat people as ends in themselves, since it allows some people to be sacrificed for the bene-
fit of others. Accordingly, both Rawls and Nozick agree that treating people as equals
requires placing limits on the manner they can be used for the benefit of others or society in
general. People should have rights that are not subject to the utilitarian calculation. Rawls
and Nozick disagree, however, on the question of which rights are most important to ensure
that people are treated as ends in themselves. Generally speaking, Rawls sees the right to a
given share of society’s resources as one of the most important rights. Yet, Nozick values
most the right individuals have over themselves—the right to “self ownership.” KYMLICKA,
supra note 78, at 107–10.
92 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 235–38.
93 Id. at 238 (some emphasis added).
94 In Nozick’s view, distributions that comply with his three principles are morally just
regardless of the issue of inequality. Id. at 166 (“Rights do not determine a social ordering
but instead set the constraints within which a social choice is to be made, by excluding
certain alternatives, fixing others, and so on. . . . If entitlements to holdings are rights to
dispose of them, then social choice must take place within the constraints of how people
choose to exercise these rights.”).
95 Id. at 150. According to Nozick, the topic of transfer involves “complicated truth,” which
he does not develop. He does mention, however, that this principle includes “descriptions of
voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other hand) fraud.” Id.
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resources;96 and (3) the principle of rectification—prescribing that entitlement
to holdings unjustly acquired or transferred must be corrected.97 According to
Nozick, only those holdings that comply with these three tenets are rightfully
possessed.98 If all private possession is rightfully held, the entire distribution of
resources is just and should not be disturbed.99
The first and second tenets of the Nozickean doctrine state that to justify
the existing distribution of holdings, past acquisitions must be legitimate.100 An
illegitimate use of force or deception, for example, undermines the justness of
entitlement to assets and, hence, the right to pass these assets to others.101 Con-
versely, when past acquisitions and transfers are legitimate, there can be no
justification for infringement upon privately held possessions. According to the
third tenet, redistributive measures aimed at remedying injustice in past acqui-
sitions or transfers of holdings, are morally justified.102 Overall, then, when
addressing incidents of unjust past acquisitions or transfers, Nozick’s theory
may allow for a more extensive state and tax schemes than Nozick initially
posits.103
Unfortunately, it is difficult to conclusively and timely identify incidences
of past injustice and, accordingly, the rightful owners of resources in such cir-
cumstances.104 Nozick thus provides a rule of thumb for detecting victims and
beneficiaries of unjust acts. He explains:
(1) . . . victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and
(2) . . . those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabili-
ties of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed
compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (assumed to be those better
off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group).105
Next, Nozick suggests that injustice in existing holdings could be rectified by a
single, across-the-board measure of ex-post resource redistribution, tailored to
appropriate from well-off members of society and bestow upon those at the
bottom of the economic scale.106 However, despite introducing this broad rule
96 Id. Unfortunately, similar to the underdevelopment of the principle of transfer, Nozick
does not expand on the principle of acquisition. Nozick notes that the principle of acquisition
raises several problems including figuring out which “unheld” things came to be held and
how. Id.
97 Id. at 152–53.
98 Id. at 151.
99 Id. at 151–52. For example, according to the transfer principle, when a person owns a
piece of land, he is free to engage in any transfer concerning that land as long as the initial
acquisition of the land was freely made and not a result of unfair competition or fraud. If all
land was justly acquired and transferred then the entire distribution of land in a given society
is fair as well.
100 Id. at 151.
101 Id. at 151–52.
102 Id. at 152–53. Nozick maintains that holdings acquired or transferred by means of, for
example, stealing or fraud, are unjustified and ought to be returned to their rightful owners.
103 Id. at 230–31 (“Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be
to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more
extensive state in order to rectify them.”).
104 Id. at 231 (suggesting the lack of historical information).
105 Id.
106 Id. (“[T]hen a rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the follow-
ing: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off
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of thumb and the method of rectification, Nozick does not further clarify the
conditions under which rectification takes place, nor does he address issues
such as how to assess the effect of prior injustices or execute corresponding
redistributive measures.107 Coming short of sufficiently elaborating on the third
tenet of rectification, Nozick leaves unanswered fundamental questions con-
cerning the viability of this principle.108 Accordingly, the extent to which recti-
fication can truly be implemented by policymakers seeking to follow the
Nozickean theory of entitlement remains to be seen.
A second, more blunt, indication of the elusiveness of the rectification
principle is offered by Nozick himself. Generally, it can be assumed that provi-
sion of a minimum standard of living for all members of the society would
benefit the most disadvantaged households and individuals at the expense of
those more affluent citizens who are better situated and possess the actual
means to finance such outlays. In the spirit of the principle of rectification, it
seems reasonable to presume Nozick would have endorsed such a provision. A
guaranteed minimum standard of living has the potential to rectify past injus-
tices by compensating those most likely to have suffered prior injustices at the
hands of those expected to have gained from these acts. Nozick, however, is far
from endorsing the provision of social minimums.109 He stresses that argu-
ments in favor of such provision do not address the question of whether the
required redistribution compromises existing, rightfully held entitlements.110
Notably, in emphasizing incidences where redistribution may cause injustice
rather than examining the broader issue of whether the present distribution of
holdings is just to begin with, Nozick practically abandons his principle of
rectification.
Nozick’s theory is further problematic when it comes to his description of
the “state of nature” and the role this description plays in generating what
Nozick offers as the foundation for a just societal order. Despite Nozick’s
attempts at portraying a starting point of free exercise of effort, talent, and
transfers, alternative accounts of the beginning of time are often riddled with
images of violence and oppression.111 Since the use of force and violence
makes acquisitions and transfers illegitimate according to the Nozickean doc-
trine,112 these descriptions call into question the justness of the present distribu-
tion of holdings. If one acknowledges that the present distribution of holdings
in the society.”). Note the similarity between this rule and the Rawlsian difference principle.
See infra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
107 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 152–53; but see Byrne, 1995, supra note 8, at 785 (suggesting
that while Nozick does not specify the circumstances that would constitute rectifiable injus-
tice, he raises important questions about what to account for when the principle of rectifica-
tion is to be developed).
108 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 152–53.
109 Id. at 232–35 (discussing Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 110–131 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds., 1962), reprinted in
MORAL CONCEPTS (Joel Feinberg ed., 1969)).
110 Id. at 235.
111 Id. at xi (“I argue that a state would arise from anarchy . . . even though no one intended
this or tried to bring it about, by a process which need not violate anyone’s rights.”); cf.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 94–98 (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651) (describing the
beginning of time as a violent state of war of all against all).
112 NOZICK, supra note 55, at 152–53; see supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text.
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is questionable, it is difficult to construe a valid argument in favor of Nozick’s
minimal state and against taxation and redistribution. Furthermore, the descrip-
tion of the initial state of the world as free of possession may also be brought
into question. If, for example, an initial joint ownership paradigm is consid-
ered,113 the inegalitarian implications of Nozick’s theory are yet again
debatable.114
In conclusion, Nozick’s theory highlights several fundamentals in societal
beliefs and mechanisms. Emphasizing the importance of privately held property
rights, Nozick outlines a framework from which issues such as equality, politi-
cal legitimacy, distributive justice, and taxation can be fleshed out and
explored. Similar to Locke and contrary to egalitarian theorists, Nozick does
not include equality among the principles necessary for normative assessment
and generally criticizes other theorists who do.115 Rather, Nozick is a propo-
nent of allowing the market to function on its own terms. In Nozick’s theory,
the main reference to social solidarity, and, hence, the possible attainment of
more than a minimal protective state, relates to the workings of the market
economy. Nozick’s third principle of rectification addresses infractions that
occur in the course of market acquisitions and transfers. That the application of
this principle is practically unattainable, however, has serious implications for
the integrity of the Nozickean theory of entitlement. The only legitimate system
of taxation under the Nozickean paradigm is generally understood to be that
which is necessary to raise revenues for the maintenance of institutions needed
to protect the system of private property and free market exchanges, such as the
monetary and justice systems.116 For this reason, placing a high value on an
unrestricted market economy and generally assuming the merit of the prevail-
ing distribution of resources, Nozick’s theory often prescribes the administra-
tion of taxation in a manner that preserves, rather than disturbs, the societal
status quo. In doing so, the theory avoids a candid consideration of plausible
infringements in the initial distribution of resources and the later chain of
acquisitions and transfers and can accordingly be challenged on these
grounds.117
113 Supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (discussing the Lockean description of the
beginning of time).
114 Despite Locke’s joint-ownership starting point, Locke’s perspective on subsequent allo-
cations of societal resources is similar to the description that Nozick provides. In addition, an
“individually held” property rights approach is not uncommon. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985).
115 Nozick questions the starting point of equality. NOZICK, supra note 55, at 215–16. He
moreover claims that an argument that draws on equality cannot be used to justify greater
equality and criticizes Rawls’s original position for using such a circular proposition. See id.
at 215 (citing RAWLS, supra note 1, at 538–41); id. at 156–57 (challenging the idea of pre-
determined “patterned” distributions); id. at 198–202 (discussing competing incentives aris-
ing in the process of determining equal distribution).
116 Id. at 26–27 (discussing the practical implications of the minimal state).
117 See e.g., id. at 153 (“The general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings are that the
holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice . . . . To turn
these general outlines into a specific theory we would have to specify the details of each of
the three principles of justice in holdings . . . . I shall not attempt that task here.”).
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II. UTILITARIANISM
A. Bentham and the Pursuit of Happiness
Utilitarianism, a more contemporary doctrine than the theory of entitle-
ment, is a normative platform essential to modern, particularly professional, tax
analysis. The theory has its roots in the work of Jeremy Bentham.118 It relies on
two key fundamentals: the first concentrates on human welfare or “utility,”119
while the second considers human welfare by appointing equal weight to each
individual.120 Utilitarianism is grounded in a vision of equality that prescribes
no one person is worth more than another.121 In its most common formula, the
theory suggests that the right act or policy is that which produces the greatest
utility for the greatest number of persons, calculated by adding up all utility
units individuals enjoy.122
Bentham believed that individuals are governed by two main forces: pain
and pleasure.123 Seen in this light, human behavior is understood as the pursuit
of utility, based on a reasoned calculation designed to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain.124 Human experience provides utility, for example, when it pro-
duces pleasure in the form of benefit, advantage, good, or happiness or when it
prevents pain through avoiding unhappiness or mischief.125 Happiness, Ben-
118 See generally BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81.
119 Id. at 2 (“Utility is an abstract term. It expresses the property or tendency of a thing to
prevent some evil or to procure some good. Evil is pain, or the cause of pain. Good is
pleasure, or the cause of pleasure.”).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Note, however, that Bentham’s understanding of utilitarianism is grounded in happiness.
Id. (“That which is conformable to the utility, or the interest of an individual, is what tends
to augment the total sum of his happiness. That which is conformable to the utility, or the
interest of a community, is what tends to augment the total sum of the happiness of the
individuals that compose it.”); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
123 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 2 (“Nature has placed man
under the empire of pleasure and of pain. We owe to them all our ideas; we refer to them all
our judgments, and all the determinations of our life.” Bentham suggested that man’s “only
object is to seek pleasure and to shun pain . . . . These eternal and irresistible sentiments
ought to be the great study of the moralist and the legislator. The principle of utility subjects
everything to these two motives.”); see also 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, The Psychology of Eco-
nomic Man, in JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 419, 433 (W. Stark ed., 1954)
[hereinafter BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS].
124 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 18 (“Every one makes him-
self the judge of his own utility; such is the fact, and such it ought to be; otherwise man
would not be a rational agent. He who is not a judge of what is agreeable to him, is less than
a child; he is an idiot.”); see also BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 434
(“Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate.”).
125 BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 437. For Bentham, utility is a
multi-faceted concept. It includes, for example, (1) intensity, (2) duration, (3) certainty or
uncertainty, and (4) propinquity or remoteness. Id. at 435. Also important is the likelihood
that the pleasure or happiness will be followed by more of the same, and that the pleasure
will not be followed by pain. Id. at 436. Bentham lists twenty-six categories of pleasure and
pain that make up utility, including (but not limited to) sense, wealth, skill, amity, good
name, power, benevolence, and association. See BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION,
supra note 81, at 21–27. Bentham also discusses how to measure the amount of pleasure and
pain. Id. at 31–32.
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tham argued, is the most desirable form of pleasure and the goal of the utility
calculus.126 As each individual seeks to maximize her happiness, it is the role
of society to bring about the greatest happiness to the greatest number.127 In
this view, each private act or policy decision is to be judged “according to the
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question.”128 Utilitarianism is thus not concerned
with moral issues per se, such as virtues, natural rights, or the social con-
tract.129 The theory suggests the government should abstain from such matters,
since they are inappropriate considerations for policy formation.130 Moreover,
preoccupation with morality diverts the government from the true principle of
policymaking: the pursuit of happiness, or utility.131 In this view, while maxi-
mizing utility may overlap with moral aspirations, it ought to guide society
even when distinct from morality.
Notwithstanding the budding divide between utilitarianism and morality,
two main arguments exist in support of utilitarianism as a standard for moral
worth.132 According to the first argument, based on equality,133 each individual
possesses unique desires, characteristics, and interests and these should be
given equal value because all individuals matter equally. The right act, which
gives equal consideration to each individual, also maximizes total utility. The
second argument places the focal point on the whole (i.e., society) rather than
the individual.134 According to this second, more commonly invoked rationale,
maximizing the good is a primary, not secondary, goal of utilitarianism, and
individuals are given equal consideration because it is in this way only that
aggregate utility is maximized. Utilitarianism, in this light, is more concerned
126 BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 421 (“My notion of man is, that,
successfully or unsuccessfully, he aims at happiness, and so will continue to aim as long as
he continues to be man, in every thing he does.”).
127 JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 195 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973)
[hereinafter BENTHAM’S POLITICAL THOUGHT].
128 Id. at 67. Utilitarianism demands not only the value of individuals’ acts or experiences
be considered based on their prospect to maximize welfare but also the behavior of the
government. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 1–2; see also id. at
60 (“Morality in general is the art of directing the actions of men in such a way as to produce
the greatest possible sum of good. Legislation ought to have precisely the same object.”).
129 See, e.g., BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 3 (finding utility a
calculation only of pleasure and pain).
130 Id. at 60–65.
131 Id. at 60; see also id. at 3 (“I am a partisan of the principle of utility when I measure my
approbation or disapprobation of a public or private act by its tendency to produce pleasure
or pain; when I employ the words just, unjust, moral, immoral, good, bad, simply as collec-
tive terms including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures . . . . He who adopts the principle
of utility, esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which result from it;
he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains which it produces.”).
132 Some, however, claim the theory of utilitarianism rests on self-evident truths or draws
on a set of axioms, not debatable rationales, and thus falls short of offering substantive
normative merit. BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 421 (“This position
may, to some eyes, present itself in the character of an axiom: as such self-evident, and not
standing in need of proof.”).
133 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 154–56.
134 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 153.
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with the welfare of society as a whole than with the welfare of its individual
members.135
Although Bentham sought to offer a theory that is compelling and simple
to implement,136 utilitarianism faces a number of practical challenges. Most of
these difficulties follow the paradigm from its inception and should be carefully
considered in policy settings.137 Importantly, the measurement and comparison
of utility units of different individuals, key functions in utilitarianism, are
highly difficult to apply because individuals are distinct in their preferences and
welfare or utility functions.138 Further, Bentham’s initial apprehension of utili-
tarianism accounting for moral and social values only deepens with later devel-
opments of utilitarianism, triggering troubling normative dilemmas once the
theory’s method of analysis is taken into full view.
Specifically, in a vastly heterogeneous world, it is nearly impossible to
accurately measure utility units obtained by different individuals and compare
the utility gains and losses associated with different policy alternatives. If util-
ity cannot be readily measured and compared, the utilitarian calculus provides
little aid in policy settings.139 Avoiding the need to fully address this challenge,
Bentham argued the comparability of utility must be assumed as a matter of
practicality. According to Bentham: “If we refuse to acknowledge the principle
of utility, we fall into a complete circle of sophistry. . . . If you desire to reject
the principle of utility . . . what is there to put in its place?”140
135 The primary duty according to the second argument is not to treat people as equals, but
to maximize total welfare. Treating individuals as equals emerges as a consequential effect
of the utility calculation. See infra text accompanying notes 153–56.
136 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 2–3 (“A principle is a first
idea, which is made the beginning or basis of a system of reasonings. . . . Such a principle
must be clearly evident . . . . Such are the axioms of mathematics.”).
137 See, e.g., id. at 45 (“The principle [of utility] is not denied, but its application is thought
to be impossible.”).
138 Id. (“There are some specious objections which I do not wish to dissemble. ‘How is it
possible to take account of all the circumstances which influence the sensibility? How can
we appreciate internal and secret dispositions, such as strength of mind, knowledge, inclina-
tions, sympathies? How can we measure these different qualities?’ . . . I allow that the
greater part of these differences in sensibility cannot be appreciated; that it would be impos-
sible to prove their existence in individual cases, or to measure their strength and degree.”).
139 Given that the pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number often involves utility
losses and gains for different individuals, without a workable standard of measurement and
comparability, there is no certain way to assess whether the added value to those who gain
offsets the losses to those who lose.
140 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81 at 18–19. Bentham prescribed
that assuming the comparability of utility, and, hence, being able to use the theory for poli-
cymaking, is better than failing to take utility into account even when it is ill applied. See id.
at 46; see also Hank Jenkins-Smith, Continuing Controversies in Policy Analysis, in POLICY
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMICS: DEVELOPMENTS, TENSIONS, PROSPECTS 23, 25 (David L. Wei-
mer ed., 1991). The comparability of utility, however, has nonetheless remained a challenge
for utilitarianism. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Com-
ment, 48 ECON. J. 635, 636 (1938) (“I find it easy to understand the belief of Bentham and
his followers that they had found the open sesame to problems of social policy. But, as time
went on, things occurred which began to shake my belief in the existence of so complete a
continuity between politics and economic analysis.”). But see id. at 635 (“I am far from
thinking that thorough-going utilitarianism a‘ la Bentham is an ultimate solution . . . . But I
have always felt that, as a first approximation . . . the approach which counts each man as
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Even if one accepts Bentham’s practical solution to the issue of measure-
ment and comparability, utilitarianism remains in conflict with basic principles
of moral worth.141 Particularly, despite the aspiration of traditional utilitarian-
ism to treat all individuals as possessing equal value, the theory may prescribe
the degradation of some for the benefit of others when this practice increases
aggregate utility.142 Lying, inhumane punishment, and repressing minorities
can be justified, and even encouraged, in the same vein. Put differently, tradi-
tional utilitarianism places all forms of happiness and pleasure on the same,
one-dimensional metric of utility. In this way, each source of benefit is equally
considered when it provides or subtracts similar units of value. Notwithstand-
ing the benefits of such a straightforward method of calculation, it may be
socially desirable to distinguish between different types of preferences based on
their social desirability.143 This distinction allows policy-makers to take less
desirable preferences out of the utility calculation or give them less utility
weight,144 while favoring other, more desirable, goals.145
The difficulty of utilitarianism to account for moral and social values is
particularly troubling in the use of money as a proxy for utility.146 When utiliz-
ing a tangible criterion such as money to capture utility, an individual’s supply
of monetary units represents access to, and enjoyment of, goods and services.
These are ultimately translated to reflect gains and losses in utility. Using this
method permits the comparison of a wide range of policies and greatly
enhances the efficacy of utilitarianism.147 However, when money substitutes
one, and, on that assumption, asks which way lies the greatest happiness, is less likely to lead
one astray . . . .”).
141 Cf. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing Rawls’s idea of justice and fairness in
society).
142 But see BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 16 (“The only differ-
ence between politics and morals is, that one directs the operations of governments, and the
other the actions of individuals; but their object is common; it is happiness. That which is
politically good cannot be morally bad, unless we suppose that the rules of arithmetic, true
for large numbers, are false for small ones. While we imagine that we follow the principle of
utility, we may nevertheless do evil. . . . That which constitutes a bad man, is the habit of
pleasures injurious to others; but this very habit supposes the absence of many kinds of
pleasure. One ought not to hold utility responsible for mistakes contrary to its nature, and
which it alone is able to rectify. If a man calculates badly, it is not arithmetic which is in
fault; it is himself.”) (second emphasis added).
143 Nozick argued, for example, for the legitimacy of preferences in calculating utility. He
theorized the existence of a neuropsychologist machine able to induce high levels of pleasure
by injecting drugs into people. If pleasure is the greatest good, everyone would volunteer to
use this machine. However, most people are unlikely to opt in favor of the machine, sug-
gesting that happiness may not be all that people care about and that other qualities to life
exist. See NOZICK, supra note 55, at 42–45.
144 Such preferences could be those that undermine acceptable notions of moral behavior in
society including, for example, preferences for slavery and other violent acts.
145 Those preferences could, for example, advance arts and poetry over plain pushpins even
when both produce similar levels and duration of utility.
146 BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 437–38; BENTHAM’S POLITICAL
THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 119–24. See also Jenkins-Smith, supra note 140, at 25.
147 Utility calculation is accomplished, for example, through the determination of what indi-
viduals would pay to obtain a benefit or avoid a loss. Consider the Kaldor-Hicks proposition
where the policy option that maximizes aggregated dollars is elected, and those who lose are
(ideally) compensated through lump-sum transfers. For a useful introduction to the Kaldor-
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for utility, utilitarianism is yet again challenged by troubling normative ques-
tions. Utilitarianism, as a paradigm, struggles to embody the complexity and,
arguably, the supremacy of social and moral values. The principle of maximiz-
ing utility, as computed in monetary terms, offers a limited platform for poli-
cies that involve preferences for certain goods and services, such as the
guarantee of a  minimum level of nutrition or shelter for all,148 when these may
not be adequately expressed by, or compensated with, dollars.149 However, as
Bentham explains: “The logic of utility consists in setting out, in all the opera-
tions of the judgment, from the calculation or comparison of pains and
pleasures, and in not allowing the interference of any other idea.”150 And so,
introducing values other than utility or wealth maximization into utilitarianism
might itself be a rejection of the theory. Accordingly, even though contempo-
rary scholarship offers alternative explanations for safeguarding access to cer-
tain rights and liberties,151 utilitarianism, as a normative platform, remains
challenged when it comes to values.152
Practically, utilitarianism suggests public policy should be based on the
pursuit of happiness, the maximization of utility, and fundamental equality.
Applying these principles to tax system design leads to two main tax policy
alternatives. The first policy option recognizes that taxation lessens the amount
of money, and thereby utility, enjoyed by individuals and demands the least
sacrifice, in collective utility loss, while maintaining social welfare at a maxi-
Hicks proposition see, for example, HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 241 (5th ed. 1999).
Cf. BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 438 (“In the way, and by means of
compensation, there is no evil to which it may not happen to be, in the instance of the
individual in question, reparable in the way of equivalent. Relation had to the individual in
question, an evil is reparable, and exactly repaired, when, after having sustained the evil and
received the compensation, it would be a matter of indifference whether to receive the like
evil, coupled with the like compensation, or not.”).
148 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
66, 87–88 (1972) (discussing the idea, for instance, that “individuals would not trade breath-
ing rights for pollution rights (even infinite pollution rights) below a certain point.”).
149 Id. at 88. According to Tribe, a rich method of analysis that reflects the complexity and
supremacy of social and moral preferences should evolve in the area of public policy. See
also id. at 92–93 (discussing the issue of distribution for society as one which should reflect
more than the gains or losses of individuals from goods and services).
150 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 81, at 3 (second emphasis added).
151 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1, at 118–23 (discussing Rawls’s theory and design of the
“veil of ignorance,” which may safeguard rights and liberties).
152 Id. at 23; John C. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice, 2 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y, 115, 115 (1985) (discussing the concepts of equity and justice from a utilitarian
perspective). Consider critical tax scholars who often challenge the seemingly objective
analysis of taxation as based on the underlying value judgments of those who occupy the
dominant, well-off positions in society. Here, the issue of values is brought to the surface to
underscore the subjectivity of contemporary—mostly utilitarianism-driven—tax analysis.
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790, 790–802 (2007) (exploring the debate over earned income tax credit, welfare programs,
and the concepts of deserving and undeserving poor as racially based); Anthony C. Infanti,
Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1249–50 (2008) (“The concept of tax equity is part of
the ‘entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another
supportive of the established order. Cloaked in a mantle of positive connotations, tax equity
is viewed as an indisputable good.’ ” Tax equity “seems nearly ‘unchallengeable, [a] part of
the natural order of things.’ ”) (quoting CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI’S MARXISM 7 (1976)).
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mum level.153 The second policy alternative prescribes that taxation levies an
equal burden on each person, based on individual utility losses, while under-
scoring the idea of equal consideration.154
Early utilitarianism, by and large, advocated the second policy alterna-
tive.155 Taxes were designed so that the loss in marginal utility of income—that
is, the loss in utility from taking a dollar away from an individual—was the
same for all persons.156 It was Bentham who first suggested that the value of
money decreases as the total amount of wealth possessed increases, a phenome-
non later known as “the decreasing marginal utility of money.”157 In Ben-
tham’s words: “[T]he quantity of happiness [read ‘utility’] produced by a
particle of wealth (each particle being of the same magnitude) will be less and
less at every [additional] particle.”158 And, so, taking a dollar away from a rich
person inflicts less utility loss than taking a dollar away from a poor person.
Therefore, if additional dollars increase utility but the incremental gain in util-
ity decreases with increased wealth, aggregate utility rises with an equal (rather
than unequal) distribution of fortune.159 Based on this view, the principles of
maximizing total utility and levying an equal tax burden on individuals both
lead to the same approach: advancing a progressive tax structure.160 Put differ-
153 MUSGRAVE, Public Finance and Distributive Justice, supra note 54, at 142.
154 Both types of policies attempt to safeguard the highest amount of aggregated utility
either as a main or derivative goal. See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 65, at 39–45 (discuss-
ing different formulations for equal sacrifice); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 77 (1959) (discussing allocation and distri-
bution); SIMONS, supra note 4, at 6–10 (discussing satisfaction and sacrifice).
155 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 3, at 925–30 (conceptualizing the doctrine of equal sacri-
fice). Note that with respect to many other issues, Mill is far from endorsing utilitarianism as
a basis for moral analysis.
156 Mill’s doctrine of equal sacrifice ultimately aims for the extraction of the least total
sacrifice from society. For a somewhat confused illustration of this idea, see id. at 927 (“As
a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their
claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as
possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the mode by which
least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole.”).
157 BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 441–42; see also Jenkins-Smith,
supra note 140, at 25. For a useful discussion on the decreasing value of money (or its
“declining utility”), see BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 65, at 40–42 (“It seems likely that a
dollar has less ‘value’ for a person with a million dollars of income than for a person with
only a thousand dollars of income. To take the same number of dollars from each is not to
require the same amount of sacrifice from them.” Blum and Kalven conclude “[i]nstead a
fair tax would take more from the wealthier . . . .”) Id. at 40.
158 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, Pannomial Fragments, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 211,
229 (John Bowring ed., 1962). BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS, supra note 123, at 439,
441–42. Bentham applies this general rule not only to money but to all other sources and
causes of pleasures. See, e.g., id. at 442 (finding that “[a]s it is with money, so is it with all
other sources or causes of pleasure.”).
159 Cf. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM 297, 304–07 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil
Code]; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (Hafner
Publ’g Co. 1948) (1789).
160 Progressivity in taxation can be achieved through different mechanisms, including, for
example, the rate and base structures. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax
Income, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2261, 2264 (2003) (reviewing MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 5,
and exploring the policy implication that “[t]o some, justice requires an income tax base,
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ently, traditional utilitarianism complements a redistributive type of taxation
where individuals with more financial means bear a gradually higher burden of
taxation.
The application of utilitarianism to tax system design is not, however, that
simple. The rate at which the value of money decreases is unknown, and ques-
tions as to who is equal and how to treat unequally situated taxpayers are also
unresolved.161 Although traditional utilitarianism generally fits with progres-
sive tax structures, the exact details of the ideal system are far from obvious.162
Moreover, utility derived from wealth is only one piece of the puzzle. The
value of well-protected property rights is of no less importance and serves as a
prerequisite for the creation of wealth and utility, weakening the case for
progressivity.163 The productivity of the economy depends, among other fac-
tors, on the effort invested by individuals. When the government takes a portion
of the return on individuals’ efforts, it might in turn reduce the overall exercise
of effort and add costly distortions to the economy.164 Further, raising taxes on
high earners could disincentivize economic activity among highly productive
members of society.165 According to this view, progressive taxation bears the
risk of reducing total revenue raised or otherwise leaving society worse off in
terms of aggregate utility than it was prior to taxation.166
Considering the potentially adverse effects of taxation, especially progres-
sive taxation, on economic productivity, modern utilitarianism requires that the
loss in utility from taxation will be less than the gain in utility from revenue
raised.167 More precisely, contemporary utilitarianism suggests that for each
while others insist that consumption is the only fair tax base. To some, progressive marginal
tax rates are morally required; to others progressive rates are anathema.”). Each approach to
taxation can be adjusted to levy a heavier tax burden on the wealthy, including exemptions
for basic goods and services in the context of consumption taxation and low (or zero) initial
tax bracket in the income tax structure.
161 See, e.g., Edwin R. A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM.
ECON. ASS’N Q. 7, 219–22 (2d ed. 1908); MUSGRAVE, supra note 154, at 98–105, 109; 3
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, The Role of the State in Fiscal Theory, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 3, 8 (2000) [hereinafter MUSGRAVE, The Role of the State]; STANLEY
W. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 21 (London & New York, MacMillan &
Co. 1871); Robbins, supra note 140, at 635–41.
162 See sources cited supra note 161. When addressing progressive tax rates, for example, it
is unclear how progressive the rates should be and what should be the income ranges to
correspond with these rates.
163 Cf. BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, supra note 159, at 311 (“When security and
equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way.”).
164 However, see supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text for similar claims and some
counter findings.
165 See supra notes 58–62.
166 See, e.g., 3 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, Social Science, Ethics, and the Role of the Public
Sector, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 104, 111–12 (2000) (explaining the
manner in which the cost of redistribution can be taken into account. According to Mus-
grave, income decline and deadweight losses from progressive taxation must be weighed
against the social gains from reducing inequality).
167 Bentham and Edgeworth argued for equal taxation based on the assumption of a fixed-
income base, but then qualified this conclusion when they allowed for the “detrimental
effects” of taxation on the available base. Smith, on the other hand, called for taxes “to take
out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it
brings into the public treasury of the state.” SMITH, supra note 55, at 372. Beginning with
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individual or commodity taxed, the relation between the loss in utility from
taxation and the gain in utility from revenue raised will be the same and that,
viewed as a whole, there will be minimum loss of aggregate utility and some
gain in social welfare.168 Consequently, once the effects of taxation and redis-
tribution are understood and accounted for, a less progressive tax scheme than
under traditional utilitarianism emerges. However, even this modern interpreta-
tion of utilitarianism, as it applies to taxation, raises critical normative dilem-
mas. For example, according to the theory’s revised fundamentals, an
individual who depends on life-saving medicine should be taxed at the maxi-
mum tax rate on her treatment. The underlying assumption is that an individual
who can afford life-saving medicine and the taxes it entails is unlikely to
reduce her consumption of the treatment even when taxed at the greatest extent.
In other words, society’s gain in utility from revenue raised in such circum-
stances will probably not be offset by a loss of utility from diminished medical
use. From an intuitive, moral point of view, however, this option seems to
constitute gross exploitation of one person’s misfortune for the benefit of
others.
From a broad societal perspective, the idea of diminishing aggregate util-
ity may not necessarily be unappealing when other benefits are considered.
Some scholars argue, for example, that in circumstances where a smaller socie-
tal pie allows for the provision of social minimums, it is a cost worth paying.169
Additionally, like other theories explored in this Article, utilitarianism rests on
unstated assumptions about the status quo and pre-tax distribution of resources.
In the quest for the greatest utility for the greatest number, utilitarianism relies
on the existing distribution to serve as a baseline from which to assess the
Pigou, what was referred to as “announcement effects” took central stage in tax theory.
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 55–75 (3d rev. ed. 1947) (To achieve the
goal of least total sacrifice, not only must there be an optimal distribution of the tax burden
but its level must be minimized. Announcement effects were measured in terms of the excess
burden or the deadweight loss that results when taxes distort economic choices.) The concept
of announcement effects was later developed into the theory of optimal taxation. For more
on this issue, see Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public
Production I: Production Efficiency, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 8 (1971); MUSGRAVE, The Role of
the State, supra note 161, at 3; 3 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, Public Finance and Finanzwis-
senschaft Traditions Compared, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 33 (2000).
168 Looking at income taxation, for example, some individuals may have a very elastic labor
supply, meaning that when tax rates on labor income increase, these individuals significantly
reduce the quantity of taxable labor. In this case, an increase in the tax rate is expected to
both yield relatively little revenue and cause a large loss of utility. Therefore, contemporary
utilitarianism suggests that these individuals ought to bear a relatively light tax burden. In
contrast, when people have an inelastic labor supply, taxes should be greater, since the gain
in revenue will be greater than the loss of utility. Ramsey showed that, provided certain
preliminary assumptions vis-a`-vis commodity taxation, deadweight loss would be minimized
with a rate structure that ensures proportional reduction of all product consumption. See
Frank. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 54 (1927).
169 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 191–93
(1980). Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ix–xi, 233, 238 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; RAWLS, supra note 1, at 26–27, 186–87.
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subtractions and additions of utility.170 This approach naturally favors main-
taining the status quo compared with alternative policy options that may, at
least in the short run, reduce total welfare. More sound policymaking must first
look into the existing pre-tax distribution of resources, including civil rights
and liberties, and evaluate its merit. Only when the pre-tax distribution is found
to be just and alternative allocations have been compared and excluded can the
exercise of utility maximization be applied to the status quo and yield just
results.171
B. The Social Welfare Function
Over time the traditional utilitarian hypothesis prescribing that individuals
have similar and comparable utility functions was rejected as scientifically
unacceptable and immeasurable through empirical authentication.172 Policy
analysts who nonetheless embraced the premise of utilitarianism could have
attempted to overlook the issue of distribution to focus exclusively on maxi-
mizing aggregate utility.173 However, the paradigm was eventually expanded to
explore new methods of comparing welfare or utility units in order to establish
a system that more effectively addresses distributional as well as efficiency
considerations.
Initially the economist Vilfredo Pareto introduced what is known today as
the concept of “Pareto improvement.”174 The Pareto idea suggests that when
comparing two economic distributions, one distribution is preferable to the
other if at least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off
170 Daniel W. Bromley, Institutional Change and Economic Efficiency, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES
735, 736–38, 740–41, 757 (1989) (citing DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND
INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1989)).
171 Any other method mandates that the pre-tax distribution of resources be corrected prior
to the pursuit of utility maximization. For an application of this perspective, see MILL, supra
note 3, at 925–46 (claiming that the principle of equal sacrifice should be applied only after
the pre-tax distribution is assured to be just). Cf. Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just
Taxation, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72, 72–75 (Richard A. Musgrave
& Alan T. Peacock eds., J. M. Buchanan trans., 1958) (suggesting that for the benefit taxa-
tion to be equitable as well as efficient, the underlying distribution of income from which
benefit taxes are drawn must also be just). See generally MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 5, at
76–128; but see Zelenak, supra note 160, at 2262–63 (suggesting that the unquestionable
embrace of the pretax income distribution was criticized already in the late 1960s by econo-
mist Carl Shoup).
172 Robbins, supra note 140, at 638–39.
173 Abram Burk, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON.
310, 326–27 (1938). One may question, however, the extent to which distributional issues
are distinct from those of welfare or utility maximization. See, e.g., Pierre Lemieux, Social
Welfare, State Intervention, and Value Judgments, 11 INDEP. REV. 19, 19 (2006) (“The state
can promote efficiency . . . in a second stage, it can . . . redistribute the supplementary output
made possible by efficiency-enhancing interventions. Efficiency and distribution are two
different issues . . . . If redistribution obviously requires value judgments, wealth creation
does not because having more goods is always desirable. . . . So thought many economists
until the 1950s. By that time, however, the ‘new welfare economics’ had all but destroyed
these conclusions and shown that value judgments are also required for creating wealth—
indeed, for even defining it.”).
174 VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 451–52 (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred
N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1906).
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(leading to a “Pareto-efficient” allocation).175 Although a powerful tool for
ensuring the efficient distribution of resources, the Pareto platform does not
provide a mechanism for ranking equally efficient allocations and, therefore,
offers an incomplete tool for policymaking.176 The “social-welfare function,”
an algebraic-utility calculation designed to reflect normative judgments con-
cerning the appropriate distribution of resources in society, emerged to fill the
void.177
Unlike the entitlement premise, the social-welfare function relies on the
assumption that the prevailing resource allocation in society might not be an
optimal one and is likely to require policy adjustments.178 The utility calcula-
tion and, more fundamentally, policymaking itself, become means in the
advancement of normative judgments. The goal for policymakers, under the
social-welfare paradigm, is to maximize societal well-being while focusing on
the welfare of specific members of the society.179 Now, the purpose of taxation
includes not only revenue-raising functions but also redistributive aspects.180
Analysts look at efficiency considerations while taking into account factors
such as the distortions caused by taxation, the resources used to implement
different tax structures, and administrative and compliance costs.181 Pareto-
efficient tax systems, where no individual can be made better off without mak-
ing someone else worse off, are then identified.182 Next, applying a particular
175 Id.; see also Manel Baucells & Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied:
A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-Up in Co-Ownership, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
1191, 1196 n.26 (2001) (“A Pareto improvement is a change that leaves some party to an
economic exchange better off and no party worse off.”) (citing DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE
IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 153–56 (1990)).
176 Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in TAX JUSTICE:
THE ONGOING DEBATE 9, 15 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
177 Id. Total welfare originally meant the utility sum of individual members of society,
giving an equal weight to each individual. Today, the empirically unattainable utility func-
tions of different individuals are replaced with an artificial design of a welfare function of
the entire society. In other words, individuals are treated as if they are comparable. Accord-
ingly, the facts that marginal utility of income is downward sloping and similar across indi-
viduals are simply assumed in the design of the function.
178 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 69, 75, 93–94 (the Nozickean undertone regarding
taxation and redistributive adjustments); Adolf Wagner, Three Extracts on Public Finance,
in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 1, 12–13 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T.
Peacock eds., Nancy Cooke trans., 1958) (claiming that proportional taxation is designed to
maintain the relatively unequal positions of taxpayers).
179 MUSGRAVE, supra note 166, at 112 (explaining that, ultimately, the social-welfare func-
tion reflects the importance which society places on wealth and income for individuals of
varying socioeconomic statuses, while leaving it to policymakers to construe the specific
shape of the desirable distribution).
180 Wagner, supra note 178, at 14 (discussing the practical application of welfare economics
to taxation). See also J. DE V. GRAAFF, THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 26–27 (1957)
(discussing distribution of outputs among final customers).
181 Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production: II—
Tax Rules, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 276–77 (1971).
182 PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 212 (10th prtg.
1975).
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welfare function, a tax structure is chosen among plausible Pareto-efficient tax
systems.183
Although the social-welfare function serves as an important development
of utilitarianism, the theory still faces serious implementation difficulties. To
begin with, there is little agreement on how to reveal the social, moral, and
economic considerations needed to form the function.184 The desirable distribu-
tion of resources and the manner in which society can determine this distribu-
tion are also unclear.185 Further, it might be impossible to employ the function
in a way that is consistent with the basics of its design because consistently
applying any collective decision-making procedure is considered an unfeasible
task.186 The current paradigm also fails to clarify what constitutes welfare. The
social-welfare approach assumes that welfare can be captured and expressed in
monetary terms. This makes the theory vulnerable to criticisms similar to those
of traditional utilitarianism, particularly with respect to the difficulty of
accounting for social and moral values.187 One plausible way to work through
these challenges is to go back to basics and openly contemplate the many
underlying normative questions of taxation, including what constitutes welfare
and what may be the optimal resource distribution for society. In this way,
theories of political legitimacy, social justice, and economics remain vital to tax
policy formation. It is possible that in the process of deliberation no one path
will emerge as more correct or compelling than another. Questions over which
idea to implement and what method of computation to follow in taxation are
yet again debatable and call for a deliberate and honest discussion.
III. THE RAWLSIAN DESIGN—JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
With his 1971 masterpiece A Theory of Justice, John Rawls centers the
philosophical-political debate on the concept of fairness rather than on entitle-
183 Note, however, that both the advantages and disadvantages of the social-welfare func-
tion stem from the theory’s method of analysis. On its face, the theory separates efficiency
considerations from value judgments while taking both into account. However, often no
single alternative tax system dominates all other options. Thus, choosing among equally
efficient tax structures must draw on value preferences.
184 See, e.g., Giovanni Montemartini, The Fundamental Principles of a Pure Theory of Pub-
lic Finance, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 137, 149–50 (Richard A. Mus-
grave & Alan T. Peacock eds., D. Bevan trans., 1958) (questioning whether an organic,
neutral body exists in society to collectively decide on social issues).
185 Policy outcomes may be ranked, for example, on the grounds that they reflect personal
preferences or judgments (such as of analysts or politicians) regarding the community’s pref-
erence for equality. See, e.g., Erik Lindahl, Some Controversial Questions in the Theory of
Taxation, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 214, 219 (Richard A. Musgrave
& Alan T. Peacock eds., Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1958) (suggesting determining the prin-
ciples of the function based on the preferences of government officials); cf. ANTHONY B.
ATKINSON, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 310 (1983) (asserting that “considerations of
income inequality” must be “precisely formulated” if they are to provide tax guidance).
186 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2–3 (1951) (demonstrat-
ing that it is impossible for any fair collective-choice process to consistently and appropri-
ately resolve interpersonal differences while also satisfying certain axioms regarding the
validity of the decision-making process).
187 Supra notes 146–52 and accompanying text.
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ment to holdings or the pursuit of happiness or utility.188 Addressing the public
sphere, Rawls works toward revealing the principles that ought to guide the
political system.189 Rawls begins his analysis by exploring how society can
reach an agreement about its fundamental characteristics,190 and he is espe-
cially concerned with defining aspects of social justice, including the division
of the societal pie and the assignment of civil rights and liberties.191 According
to Rawls, one main reason the principles of justice that evolve from his theory
are superior to other normative doctrines is that they develop from a plausible
social contract.192 That is, if people were truly positioned in a pre-state condi-
tion and had to decide which principles should govern their society, they would
have reasonably chosen his principles.193
Rawls arrives at his principles of justice based on his interpretation of the
“original position.”194 The Rawlsian original position is a hypothetical—as
opposed to a historical—event, in which individual representatives of society
(the “deliberators” or “negotiators”) decide on the principles that will guide the
political order of the future, emerging state.195 The deliberators are free, equal,
and rational individuals who represent all segments of society, but lack knowl-
edge of their own abilities or status in it.196 They are acquainted with basic
188 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 3.
189 Id. at 4, 7–8, 12.
190 Id. at 10, 15.
191 Id. at 4–5. Rawls recognizes that in a pluralistic society, individuals hold different relig-
ious, philosophical, and moral beliefs. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29–32
(1993). Nevertheless, to coexist, it is necessary to find an “overlapping consensus” on what
principles will be embraced and used to develop social institutions. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra
note 1, at 340.
192 Id. at 10–11. Different thinkers, including Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Rousseau endorse
the social-contract approach but arrive at very different results. They are all, however, sub-
ject to the same criticism—that is, relying on a state of nature or a contract that never
existed, and thus, citizens and governments cannot be bound by it. As Dworkin says: “A
hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.”
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 169, at 151. However, as Dworkin notes,
it is possible to view the social contract not primarily as an agreement, actual or hypotheti-
cal, but as an intellectual exercise for arriving at certain moral fundamentals. Id. at 169.
Accordingly, the idea of a state of nature is invoked to model the moral views of individuals
rather than to describe a historical pre-condition. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11 (“[T]he original
position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social
contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of
affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypotheti-
cal situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”) (emphasis
added). The Rawlsian hypothetical contract is therefore a way of understanding a certain
conception of fairness, and a way of extracting the consequences of that conception for the
social order.
193 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12; see also id. at 123–30.
194 Id. at 11, 15–19.
195 Id. at 10; see also id. at 11 (“This original position is not, of course, thought of as an
actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is under-
stood as a purely hypothetical situation . . . .”).
196 Id. at 11 (“Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place
in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even
assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psycholog-
ical propensities.”). Rawls asserts that in choosing principles of justice, the deliberators’
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theories of human psychology, economics, and social structure, to the exclusion
of their own particular views or psychological characteristics.197 Thus, accord-
ing to the Rawlsian original position, the deliberators are situated in a
nonbiased, yet educated, sphere. They are, as Rawls puts it, behind a “veil of
ignorance.”198
According to Rawls, people are committed to the idea of a good life,
which may be advanced through the pursuit of whatever life plans they have.199
Rawls posits that the resources most needed to carry out this commitment are
called “primary goods.”200 Only one kind of primary goods, social primary
goods, can be distributed by social institutions. These goods are the result of
social cooperation and include, among others, income, wealth, opportunity,
power, rights, and liberties.201 In choosing the principles of justice, the deliber-
ators seek to maximize their access to social primary goods.202 The deliberators
understand that mutual cooperation increases the possibility of pursuing their
individual goals, encouraging them to establish social alliances.203 Positioned
behind a veil of ignorance, each deliberator remains oblivious to her place in
society and is expected to be sympathetic to a wide spectrum of interests.204
It becomes clear, therefore, that to maximize social benefits, the deliber-
ators must seek long-term societal stability.205 The deliberators are accordingly
interested in eliciting the willing cooperation of all members of the society,206
making the coming together of mutual interests inherent to the Rawlsian
design.207 According to Rawls, assuming a veil of ignorance and rational self-
interested deliberators “achieves much the same purpose as benevolence”
natural fortune and social circumstances should not enter into the process. Thus, he charac-
terizes the original position as “the appropriate initial status quo.” See id. at 10–12.
197 Id. at 119; see also id. at 74.
198 Id. at 118; see also id. at 11.
199 Id. at 10–11, 54, 131–32.
200 Id. at 54. There are two kinds of primary goods: social and natural. The second kind of
goods, “natural primary goods,” includes health, intelligence, vigor, imagination, and natural
talents. Natural primary goods are affected by social institutions, but are not directly distrib-
uted by them. Id.
201 Id. at 54–55.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 4. In the process of optimizing the access to social primary goods, conflicts over
the allocation of goods are expected to occur. Id.
204 Id. at 120–21.
205 Id. at 6.
206 Id. at 13–14. The desire to elicit the willing cooperation of all members of the society is
central to the Rawlsian analysis even when the allocation of goods that one receives accord-
ing to the resulting order will be less than he would have originally desired. Id. at 13.
207 Id. at 12–13. Rawls admits to modifying the original position in order to make sure that
it yields principles that match common intuitions of fairness. While Rawls at times claims
that the construction of the original position has no necessary bearing on his resulting princi-
ples of justice, in other places he acknowledges that the two are interdependent. Id. at 18
(“[W]e have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can
revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points
are liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at other[ ] [times] withdrawing our judgments and conforming
them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation
that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered
judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”).
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because the deliberators must identify with other individuals and consider their
interests as their own.208 In this manner, agreements made in the original posi-
tion put individuals on a level playing field so that the original position natu-
rally yields an egalitarian starting point for the political order under
consideration.209
Rawls reasons that because the deliberators are morally equal, unaware of
their status in the society to emerge and their personal talents and other charac-
teristics, each deliberator will agree to an equal access to social primary
goods.210 Rawls assumes risk-averse behavior, prescribing that each deliberator
be unwilling to gamble on ending up disadvantaged.211 However, the deliber-
ators can enlarge the societal pie if some individuals are provided better access
to social primary goods than others.212 For this reason, a self-interested pursuit
of the best possible life prospect gives rise to the deliberators accepting some
discrepancies in the access to social primary goods, leading to a societal order
more complex than a strictly egalitarian one.
Rawls hypothesizes that the deliberators select what he calls “the differ-
ence principle.”213 According to the difference principle, “[a]ll social values—
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-
respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or
all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.”214 Any difference—that is, any
inequality in the access to social primary goods—is just only if it serves to
improve the lot of the worst-off members of society. Stated another way, in the
original position the deliberators agree to some disparity in the access to social
primary goods on the condition that the most disadvantaged individuals are
made better off under an unequal, rather than equal, distribution.215 The differ-
208 Id. at 128; see also id. at 12–13, 153–56 (prescribing that the life plans of each individ-
ual are important in and of themselves so that no representative will be willing to agree to a
principle which allows anyone to be used and sacrificed to achieve someone else’s goals).
209 Id. at 55, 65–66, 86–93, 130.
210 Id. at 118, 130 (explaining it would be rational for each individual interested in further-
ing his life plans to accept a greater than equal share, but irrational to accept anything less).
211 Id. at 144. Some economists explored social interactions in similar terms of gambling.
See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of
Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434–35 (1953); ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS xiii (1944); William Vickrey, Measuring
Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk, 13 ECONOMETRICA 319, 324–28 (1945); John C. Har-
sanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63
J. POL. ECON. 309, 316 (1955). However, the introduction of risk aversion may weaken the
moral merit of Rawls’s theory to the extent that the resulting distribution stems from a utility
maximization calculation rather than from the premise of equal worth.
212 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 130–31. For example, when additional incentives are provided
for those accomplishing a socially desirable task, more of that task might be pursued, making
everyone better off.
213 Id. at 65–70, 131.
214 Id. at 54.
215 Id. at 65, 68. More specifically, Rawls’s general rule is comprised of three components
arranged according to a principle of “lexical order.” Id. at 37–38. This order prescribes that
some social goods are more important than others and cannot be sacrificed to improve their
distribution. For that matter, equal access to liberty takes precedence over equal access to
opportunity, which is more important than equal access to resources. Id. at 38. Within each
category, inequality is only allowed when it benefits the least well off. See id. at 65.
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ence principle is hence set to ensure that the deliberators optimize their access
to social primary goods in case they end up at the bottom of the social lad-
der,216 while allowing them to optimize this access under other scenarios (the
maximin strategy).217
Notwithstanding the general supremacy of Rawls’s difference principle,
inequality in what Rawls calls “natural primary goods”—including health,
intelligence, and other inherited traits—is not subject to the difference princi-
ple.218 Rawls, for example, argues for the justness of equality in economic
opportunity. This includes, particularly, “equal chances of education and cul-
ture for persons similarly endowed and motivated.”219 Accordingly, individuals
not similarly endowed and motivated may be unable to enjoy the same opportu-
nities as others. When the underlying distribution is just, inequality in the allo-
cation of resources that results from voluntary exchanges under the conditions
of fair competition is also allowed.220 However, in a free-market economy,
inequality in natural characteristics generally leads to other forms of disparity.
If a naturally gifted pianist and a layperson are each given an equal opportunity
to play in an orchestra, for example, the former would outperform the latter. In
a market economy, the naturally endowed individual—the person who is
healthier, more intelligent, and more imaginative—is more likely to receive a
higher-paying job and be in a better position to provide a good life for her
216 See, e.g., Musgrave, supra note 176, at 16–17 (explaining that under the veil of igno-
rance, the problem of distributive justice turns to be one of choice under uncertainty, and
depends on individuals’ levels of risk aversion. Assuming extreme risk aversion, maximin
distribution that maximizes the welfare of the least advantaged members of society will be
chosen. A utilitarian view of distribution as a matter of rational choice is thus retained under
Rawls’s design, but only after incorporating the veil of ignorance paradigm.).
217 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 72–73 (although rejecting the equalization of the difference
principle with the “maximin criterion” as the latter may imply extreme attitudes toward risk);
see also id. at 133. Imagine the following distributive scheme in a three-person world: (1) 9:
6: 0; (2) 10: 3: 2; (3) 5: 5: 5. Rawls’s principles make a case for option three if the likelihood
to be in the best or the worst position in society is unknown. Under the third option, ending
up in the worst position still gives those at the bottom more than they would receive occupy-
ing the bottom of options one or two. It is difficult, however, to assess the rationality of
gambling without knowing something about the probability of ending up with each choice,
or about people’s inclination to risk. Such doubts come back to the claim that Rawls only
arrives at the difference principle because he designs the veil of ignorance so as to yield it.
See supra note 207. Cf. Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 921–22 (1980) (arguing that the worst off should prefer inequality if
there is a chance for a better position but no chance for a worse one). On the one hand,
Rawls is opposed to large accumulations of wealth, and this presumably extends to unequal
distributions of wealth even when the poor are not made worse off. On the other hand, it is
possible to argue that the Rawlsian paradigm is not sufficiently egalitarian in that it may
allow significant wealth and income disparities as long as the position of the worse off is
improved to some, even if minor, extent.
218 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 54; see also id. at 69.
219 Id. at 243.
220 Id. at 57–58, 131; Nagel, supra note 4, at 2016 (“Rawls always emphasizes that the
main target of evaluation for his principles of justice is the basic structure of society, which
determines the ex ante allocation of opportunities and expectations at birth. If the basic
structure is fair, then inequalities arising through the free exercise of their autonomy by
individuals living out their lives inside that structure are not objectionable from the stand-
point of justice.”).
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family and other loved ones. Not oblivious to this predisposition, Rawls states
that too much inequality is inherently offensive as it undermines social institu-
tions, including individuals’ right to equality of opportunity.221
Equal opportunity puts individuals on a level footing so that their lives are
shaped based on the choices they make rather than arbitrary circumstances.222
In Rawls’s view, natural talents and social circumstances are a matter of luck
that yields no moral entitlement. In Rawls’s words: “No one deserves his
greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in soci-
ety.”223 Moreover, social institutions are “put in jeopardy when inequalities of
wealth exceed a certain limit; and political liberty likewise tends to lose its
value, and representative government to become such in appearance only.”224
Rawls relies on either transfer payments or a negative income tax structure to
prevent too much inequality.225 He, nonetheless, avoids clarifying how much
inequality is too much. Rather, at one point Rawls suggests that the limits of
inequality are “a matter of political judgment guided by theory, good sense, and
plain hunch.”226
To conclude, Rawls reasons that from behind a veil of ignorance, people
would agree on principles of general equality with the goal of maximizing the
welfare of the worst off members of society. This egalitarian undercurrent
requires political intervention in the workings of the market economy.227 Read
in this light, the Rawlsian theory of justice provides a standard against which
the fairness of both the pre- and post-tax distributions of resources is to be
evaluated. In a society structured in accordance with the Rawlsian rules of jus-
tice, the purpose of taxation is “to preserve an approximate justice in distribu-
tive shares” and “raise the revenues that justice requires.”228 In a society not
structured in accordance with the Rawlsian rules of justice, the tax system takes
221 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 245–46. Unfortunately, Rawls leaves the idea of equality of
opportunity fairly undeveloped, allowing major controversies in its interpretation. KYM-
LICKA, supra note 78, at 56 (finding that although people generally accept the principle of
equality of opportunity, they differ on the issue of its implementation. “Some people believe
that [enforcing] non-discrimination in education and employment is sufficient [to comply
with such a requirement]. Others argue that affirmative action programmes are required for
economically and culturally disadvantaged groups, if their members are to have a genuinely
equal opportunity to acquire the qualifications necessary for economic success.”).
222 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 16.
223 Id. at 87. Rawls states that the conditions that characterize the original position should
not be misunderstood. The idea is to clarify the restrictions most reasonable to impose on
principles of justice. “Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should
be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances . . . .” Id. at 16.
224 Id. at 246.
225 Id.
226 Id. (in the context of limiting inherited wealth). Cf. Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe
Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1279 (2009) (“The concerns that moti-
vated Rawls . . . were not simply a matter of looking at who had the smallest incomes and
trying to help those individuals by transferring resources to them from those with more to
give. He was not, in other words, advocating some mechanical and arbitrary narrowing of
living standards for its own sake. He was instead concerned that the least fortunate were
excluded from full participation in society.”).
227 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 62–63 (stressing the importance of fairness considerations more
than efficiency constraints).
228 Id. at 245–46.
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on an additional role of redistribution intended to ensure that the after-tax allo-
cation of resources complies with the fundamentals of the theory.229
Because the free-market economy and competitive prices do not take
human needs into account, revenue-raising becomes a means to level the play-
ing field and provide for certain societal basics, including freedom of political
thought and equality of opportunity in education.230 Therefore, a society struc-
tured in accordance with the Rawlsian doctrine applies constant adjustments.231
Such adjustments bear the risk of reducing the size of the societal pie. This,
however, does not necessarily undermine Rawls’s theory of justice given that
the main goal of the Rawlsian society and its institutions is to aid in the estab-
lishment of justice more than to maximize total welfare.232
In a system that evolves from a just distribution, Rawls appears to prefer a
proportional consumption tax to raise revenue.233 Rawls argues that such a
structure treats all individuals equally and taxes what is taken out of the com-
mon pool rather than what is productively added to it.234 Rawls nonetheless
admits that progressive tax rates may be necessary to prevent harmful accumu-
lations of resources and protect equality.235 It is unclear, however, whether
strong arguments for a progressive tax structure emerge from Rawls’s frame-
work.236 In fact, the theory might be too general to favor any one particular
form of taxation over another.237
229 Id. at 245. For instance, if the pre-tax distribution of income, a Rawlsian social primary
good, fails to satisfy the difference principle, the tax system can then be the mechanism
utilized to ensure that the after-tax allocation of income is just. This could be achieved
through collecting revenues from well-off taxpayers and transferring these funds to the least
advantaged.
230 Id. at 244 (asserting that ensuring social minimum is necessary because “[a] competitive
price system gives no consideration to needs and therefore it cannot be the sole device of
distribution.”).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 64–65.
233 See, e.g., id. at 246 (“Leaving aside many complications, it is worth noting that a pro-
portional expenditure tax may be part of the best tax scheme.”).
234 Id. The justness of taxing consumption goes all the way back to the work of Thomas
Hobbes. HOBBES, supra note 111, at 179. Several authors have more recently advocated in
favor of a consumption taxation. See generally Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413
(2006); Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to
Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789 (2007); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consump-
tion Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745 (2007); Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines
Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2009).
235 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 246.
236 An insightful analysis that involves the application of the Rawlsian doctrine to the tax
system is offered by Musgrave. See Musgrave, supra note 176, at 16–17 (applying the max-
imin analysis while taking into account the announcement effects of taxation).
237 See, e.g., Byrne, 1995, supra note 8, at 777; cf. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 246–47; but see
Sugin, supra note 8, at 1993–94 (suggesting that “[r]ather than searching in theories of
justice for required precepts of taxation, we might more fruitfully ask what constraints, if
any, a particular theory of justice imposes on the tax system. Application of such an
approach to Rawls’s theory of justice may explain his apparent preference for a flat con-
sumption-based tax. . . . If Rawls’s discussion of economic justice is treated as offering
limitations rather than mandates for taxation, then a variety of tax systems may be part of a
just Rawlsian society.”).
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article explores three theories of normative analysis and the manner
in which these theories may inform tax policymaking in a modern society.
Regardless of their specific differences, the normative perspectives presented
here crystallize the idea that what individuals can expect to receive in fair
return for their labor and capital depends on the merit of the pre- and post-tax
distributions of resources in society. This merit is evaluated differently by each
of the normative doctrines. All three theories, however, raise questions and
employ analytic tools essential to public and, particularly, fiscal policymaking.
According to the theory of entitlement, the principles of natural or divine
law entitle each person to the benefits gained from the exercise of free will and
effort. Followers of this paradigm usually embrace unaltered the pre-tax distri-
bution of resources and any proceeding rewards obtained through voluntary
market exchanges. To some, the justness of private entitlement and, accord-
ingly, the existing distribution of resources, is self-evident. Others find justifi-
cation by asserting the moral deservedness of reward for effort or the
importance of incentives created under a system of entitlement. Still others
emphasize individuals’ rights and liberties and, more generally, the prospect of
mutual advantage. Regardless of one’s perspective on either the Lockean or
more modern Nozickean interpretation, those who adhere to the entitlement
paradigm believe that safeguarding the right to private property and, thereby,
the existing distribution of holdings, is a necessary step in determining the role
of the government in civil society. Entitlement theorists, then, offer a frame-
work from which to analyze government authority, particularly to intervene in
the private affairs of individuals, including through the levy of taxes.
The entitlement theory does not prescribe that people’s possessions should
be equally distributed nor does it follow other pre-determined distributional
ends. Rather, the theory prescribes that the pre-tax distribution of resources is
just if it represents the product of an unfettered market economy. This includes,
for example, distributions that are the result of unequal bargaining relation-
ships, such as those involving natural monopolies and cartels. According to
certain interpretations of entitlement, taxation deprives individuals of their right
to autonomy. Even without extending the entitlement concept to this degree,
entitlement theorists discourage most forms of taxation and especially those tax
schemes aimed at redistribution, because the imposition of taxes is expected to
violate (at least some) rightfully held property rights. However, the entitlement
doctrine does not disqualify all forms of taxation and redistribution.
Entitlement theorists advocate for strong civil, especially property, rights,
and for the value of the political order in protecting its citizens and enabling the
workings of a market economy. To this end, taxation is required as a means, at
the very least, of raising the revenue needed to fund society and its institutions.
However, the doctrine fails to persuasively account for the justness of entitle-
ment to the entire share of returns on labor and capital and may, therefore,
allow for some portion of market returns to be taxed and redistributed. It can be
argued that a portion of these returns is the product of luck, societal conditions,
or infringements in the workings of the free-market economy, such as holdings
tainted by force or deception. This portion, the argument goes, ought to be
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redistributed to a more just destination than that which is created under the
status quo. Advocates of the Lockean paradigm may endorse redistribution as
long as it ensures that effort invested by individuals is rightfully, but not exces-
sively, rewarded and economic incentives remain at an efficient and effective
level. Likewise, for the Nozickean doctrine to maintain integrity, its proponents
ought to accept, even if reluctantly, some redistribution when this allows the
rectification of past injustices in the acquisition or transfer of holdings. For
these reasons, although the entitlement doctrine precludes very progressive tax
structures it may allow for other, less aggressive, schemes.
In developing a different line of thinking, Bentham and his followers
depart from the entitlement premise. Instead of reaching out to a natural or
divine order, utilitarianism turns to reason, simplicity, and the pursuit of happi-
ness and utility. The underlying principle of utilitarianism is that all individuals
and society as a whole are dominated by two forces: pleasure and pain. The
first is good and should be pursued, while the second is bad and must be
avoided. The key goal for people and governments becomes the pursuit of the
greatest good for the greatest number while placing pleasure and pain on the
same metric of utility. Because marginal utility declines as income rises, tradi-
tional utilitarianism suggests that aggregate utility is maximized by an equal—
as opposed to unequal—distribution of resources. On a public policy scale, this
objective leads to the demand for an equalization of resources among members
of the society. The tax system that develops under this premise prescribes a
redistributive (i.e., progressive) tax structure so that whatever the pre-tax distri-
bution of resources may be, the after-tax allocation aims at maximum equality.
However, a more profound examination of the theory and its repercussions
reveals that absolute equality might be an undesirable goal for society.
Inequality, at least to some extent, provides an important incentive for
economic productivity, making absolute equalization an unwise societal aspira-
tion. Moreover, the assumption of a fixed amount of resources, which can be
equally divided among members of society, was also refuted. Modern utilitari-
anism clarifies that taxation can negatively affect market production by reduc-
ing the gain from productive effort. This effect, and its distribution across
households and individuals, is difficult to estimate. For this reason, taxation
might not only distort economic activity and reduce the societal pie and total
revenue raised, but could also treat similarly situated taxpayers differently.
According to a more modern interpretation of utilitarianism, as it applies to the
area of taxation, the after-tax loss in utility from taxation and the after-tax gain
in utility from revenue raised must be comparable with a minimal loss in aggre-
gate utility and, overall, net gain in social welfare. Unfortunately, although this
interpretation of utilitarianism solves a number of issues concerning the cost
associated with taxation and redistribution, serious doubts remain concerning
the merit of the theory. Specifically, by focusing on aggregate utility, utilitari-
anism might allow the subordination of moral and social considerations to effi-
ciency constraints, resulting in tax systems that put individuals in a position
where they are used as means for others, rather than as equal beings and ends in
themselves.
More recently, attempts have been made to rationalize the implementation
of what is known as the social-welfare function. The social-welfare function is
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reached by artificially constructing a collective function based on value judg-
ments about the desirable distribution of resources in society. It aspires to
weigh fairness considerations independently from efficiency constraints, while
taking both into account. The feasibility of disjointedly analyzing these issues
is, nevertheless, questionable. Even more troubling is that there is little agree-
ment on how the social, political and economic considerations, which ought to
guide the construction of the social welfare function, are to be revealed and
implemented with consistency and integrity.
Finally, the Rawlsian doctrine suggests that the principles to guide the
political system should be decided from behind a veil of ignorance. In contrast
with entitlement theorists, Rawls offers a hypothetical—compared with histori-
cal—starting point where representative men and women gather to lay down
the principles of justice to govern the society expected to emerge. The repre-
sentatives are rational, mutually disinterested, risk-averse individuals, seeking
to further their own life plans and unaware of their particular characteristics or
status in the emerging society. Drawing on the risk-averse assumption, a max-
imin solution is derived. In other words, according to Rawls the general princi-
ple that will be unanimously decided from behind the veil of ignorance is the
equal distribution of chances to acquire social primary goods, including
income, wealth, power and opportunity, coupled with the difference principle.
Rawls’s difference principle prescribes that inequality in the distribution of
chances to acquire primary social goods may be tolerated only to the extent that
it improves the lot of the least advantaged members of society. Further, while
Rawls allows for some disparity, he argues against “too much inequality” and
calls for using the tax system to constantly correct the market distribution of
resources in addition to its revenue-raising function.
To conclude, under all three normative theories explored in this Article, a
person living in civil society can reasonably expect to only receive a net reward
for his effort and capital: the gross amount of returns less taxes raised for the
maintenance of the existing societal order and its institutions. If the pre-tax
distribution of resources is without merit, however merit is conceived by each
of the theories, individuals should expect the levy of additional taxes as a redis-
tributive measure. Accordingly, the one conclusion consistent with all three
normative theories is that a key role for taxation is to intervene in the free-
market economy, at the very least, for the purpose of raising revenue.
Whether it is based on rewarding effort but not luck or societal conditions,
rectifying past injustice, maximizing utility, or fairness considerations, some
form of redistribution of resources can also be justified. The degree of govern-
ment intervention and the level of redistribution ultimately depend on society’s
views on social and, especially, distributive justice and the efficiency cost of
policy implementations. Accordingly, the extent to which the present tax dis-
course avoids incorporating a well-defined normative framework concerning
the meaning and attainment of justice, alongside efficiency-based analyses, is
both puzzling and disturbing. While this Article does not claim that normative
perspectives can be agreed upon or proven, it suggests that a candid and com-
prehensive elaboration of normative beliefs and values and how they shed light
on taxation would lead to a better understanding of society and an improved tax
system. This, in the long run, may bring society closer to the realization of tax
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policies that are normatively worthy and socially, politically, and economically
within reach.
In a modern democracy that is diverse and constantly changing, policy
issues are likely to raise a mix of normative perspectives. Moreover, a tax
structure that fits certain societal conditions might be unworkable in others. By
embracing the co-existence of normative beliefs—rather than searching for one
ideal theory—various tax structures can evolve. Fairness considerations drawn
from the Rawlsian doctrine could, for instance, support adjustments to the pre-
tax resource distribution either through tax expenditures or the finance of
spending programs directed toward the less fortunate. At the same time, entitle-
ment theory can justify shying away from extreme levels of taxation. Utilitari-
anism may add depth to both perspectives by emphasizing the value of
redistribution in increasing societal welfare on the one hand while underscoring
the efficiency cost of going too far with equalization on the other. In the pro-
cess of generating a viable tax discourse, fundamental disagreements about nor-
mative perspectives are likely to arise. These issues tend not to be the focus of
tax analysis and debate. However, as this Article illustrates, if tax policy is to
evolve in a clear and effective manner, these underlying attitudes and assump-
tions should be made the subject of serious discourse—sooner rather than later.
